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TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF
MARXIST DISCOURSE: MAJOR ERNESTO
"CHE" GUEVARA'S FEBRUARY 26, 1965




This essay examines the language strategies that socialist leader Che Gue
vara used to address a multi-national Third World delegation of socialist and
sympathetic nations in 1965. As a Marxist revolutionary, Che's message to
the Third World involved the themes of resistance and aggression. Specif
ically, Che advocated Third World military unity to thwart the imperialist
policies of the First World. The success of such discourse, calling for personal
sacrifice and dangerous armed struggle, demanded specific justificatory
strategies to gain popular appeal, an appeal that is seldom understood by
members of the First World.
Not only was Marxist justificatory rhetoric of aggression seldom under
stood in the First World, it was intentionally polarized, marginalized, and
rejected. Indeed, from the perspective of First World politics and economics,
Che's advocation of African-Asian solidarity grounded in the Marxist tenets
of armed insurrection and national empowerment constituted a perceived
threat. Consequently, Che's call to revolution was met with physical force,
as has been the larger context of the socialist struggle. In addition, recent
developments in the Soviet Union have drastically undermined the credi
bility and feasibility of the Marxist agenda. In other words, the feasibility of
Che's message, criticized and marginalized by First World power ideologies,
is less viable a political program now than when it was articulated thirty years
ago.
The question arises; if Marxist ideology is less interesting in the early 1990s
than it was in the late 1960s, why review an obscure speech from a faded,
albeit interesting, political figure whose credibility Is unrecognized by First
World political audiences? To answer this question, the reader must consider
that Che's speech and political perspectives were a response to conditions
of war and aggression sponsored by First World economic interests, interests
which cultivated elaborate rhetorical strategies to perpetuate and justify their
transgressions.' These strategies have been well documented, and it is not
' For a concise history of the conditions of war and hostility sponsored by the First
World, see Michel Beaud, A History of Capitalism: 1500-1980, trans., Tom Dickman
and Anny Lefebvre (New York; Monthly Review Press, 1983).
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 30, Nos. 1-4 (1993), 1-18.
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the intent of this essay to recapitulate them here.^ While there have been
many studies of First World ideological positions with regard to war and
aggression in Third World nations, there have been few studies that have
explored the rhetorical strategies of the marginalized Other, the Third World
Marxist rhetorician.^
With the events of the recent Cold War in mind, and in particular, the
precariously strained relations between the Nation of Cuba and the United
States, this current study heeds Robert Ivie's (1974) call for scholars of rhetoric
to "respond" to how policy makers justify war and aggression. Che is an
important figure for this study because of his prominence in the Cuban
revolution, his high administrative post in the young Castro administration,
and his position as a spokesperson for millions of Latin Americans and Af
ricans who have struggled against First World imperialism and have tried to
find political and economic sovereignty.
Central to biases grounding this essay is the sentiment that rhetorical
criticism is be a process whereby divergent patterns of experience are brought
together and mediated so that the dialectical tension between them can be
channeled into productive rather than destructive agendas. Indeed, in Ivie's
studies of war rhetoric a similar concern is expressed, one in which ought
^ The following articles are particularly noteworthy examples of ideological critiques
of either First World aggression or First World ideology generally; Jeff Bass and Richard
Cherwitz, "Imperial Mission and Manifest Destiny: A Case Study of Political Myth in
Rhetorical Discourse," Southern Speech Communication Journal XLIII (1978): 213-232;
Samuel L. Becker, "Marxist Approaches to Media Studies: The British Experience,"
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 1 (1984): 66-80; Edwin Black, "Ideological Jus
tifications," Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 (1984): 144-150; Ariel Dorfman and Armand
Mattelart, How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic, trans.,
David Kunzle (New York: International General, 1975); Lawrence Crososbert, "Strat
egies of Marxist Cultural Interpretation," Critical Studies in Mass Communication 1
(1984): 392-421; Robert Ivie, "Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War,"
Communication Monographs 47 (1980): 279-94; "Presidential Motives for War," Quar
terly Journal of Speech 60 (1974): 346-109; "Progressive Form and Mexican Culpability
in Polk's Justification of War," Central States Speech Journal 30(1979): 311-320; "Speak
ing 'Common Sense' About the Soviet Threat: Ronald Reagan's Rhetorical Stance,"
Western Journal of Speech Communication 47 (1984): 39-50; "The Metaphor of Force
in Prowar Discourse: The Case of 1812," Quarterly Journal of Speech 68 (1982): 240-
53; "William McKinley: An Advocate of Imperialism," Western Journal of Speech Com
munication; and Michael J. Sproule, "Propaganda and American Ideological Critique,"
Communication Yearbook 14 (Newbury Park: Sage, 1991) 211-238.
^ In contrast to the abundance of studies located in the previous footnote, my search
for essays similar in intent to my own located only two studies that specifically focused
on Marxist Third World discourse. These studies are Beatrice K. Reynolds, "Mao Tse-
Tung: Rhetoric of a Revolutionary," Central States Speech Journal 27 (1976): 212-217;
and Tvan Van Dinh, "Ho Chi Minh as Communicator," Journal of Communication 26
(1976): 142-147. One additional study, William J. Starosta's "Roots for an Older Rhet
oric: On Rhetorical Effectiveness in the Third World," Western Journal of Speech
Communication 43 (1979): 278-287, discussed the characteristics of a Third World
audience, but only marginally discussed its relationship to Marxist discourse. Finally,
Jack Butler, "Russian Rhetoric: A Discipline Manipulated by Communism," Quarterly
Journal of Speech 50 (1969): 229-239, addresses some of the concerns necessary for
understanding Communist discourse, but it does not address specifically the concerns
of Third World Marxist discourse.
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to be taken more seriously by scholars of rhetoric. He explains that "[rjhetorical
studies can and should function as an instrument of life, especially through
the critical analysis of war discourse" (337).
in short, along with Ivie, this essay calls for rhetorical critics to scrutinize
the rhetoric of aggression that propels societies into ideological and physical
warfare. Simply, it is not enough to understand the rhetoric of U.S. war
aggression without appreciating the dialectical counterpart of that discourse.
Before citizens of this nation can understand who they are in relationship
to collective acts of U.S. aggression in the Third World, they need to un
derstand the collective acts of retaliatory aggression sponsored by socialist
leaders in the Third World. More specifically, before critics can judge the
viability of war discourse being offered to the American people, the critics
need to have a greater appreciation for how the "enemy" portrays its ide
ological struggle against the U.S.
The enemy may no longer be Marxist, but the enemy will always remain
as long as the United States engages in an imperialist dialectic. An ideological
counter-partner will be created or found. This in mind, Ivie's construct of
rhetoric, as an instrument of life, suggests that it is appropriate for criticism
to reveal how the political agendas of elite or revolutionary policy makers
potentially threaten regional and world peace. Research in this area can
"assist rhetoricians substantially in their search for additional rhetorical forms
associated with aggressive human behaviors" (345).
In order to accomplish my critical goals, this paper is organized according
to the following sections. First, for readers unfamiliar with Che Guevara and
his significance as a persuader, I will discuss Che's life and highlight how he
represented an "enactment" of his message which gave him great credibility
as a speaker and aided the socialist cause in trying to unite Latin America
against First World oppression. Second, in order to specifically treat Che's
three main topics in this speech—the function of socialism, the moral re
sponsibility of economics, and the unjust nature of international law—I will
briefly review some of the assumptions that underlie Marxist political dis
course. The third, fourth, and fifth sections of this paper involve a more
specific and detailed criticism of each of Che's three topics.
An Introduction to Che Guevara
Che Guevara was raised in an bourgeois Argentinean middle-class family
and earned a medical degree from the University of Buenos Aires in 1953.
In his college years he traveled widely through Southern and Central America
and was exposed to the squalor and depravity that characterized the lives
of most of the Latin American peoples during this period of American eco
nomic expansion. Soon after graduation, Che rejected the practice of med
icine to engage in political activity. For Che, political activity was a pursuit
that he felt was analogous, on the societal realm, to the physician's effort to
cure disease in the human body.
Che's anti-American political activity earned him recognition in revolu
tionary circles and he was soon introduced to Fidel Castro in Mexico. Within
a short period of time, Castro persuaded Che to join his 1956 revolution.
With less than 100 men, Castro and Che navigated a decrypted boat from
Mexico to Cuba and initiated a military campaign that succeeded in over-
7
et al.: Volume 30, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1992/Winter 1993/Spring 1993/
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2021
4  SPEAKER AND GAVEL
throwing the American backed Batista regime In 1959. Upon taking control
of the Island, Castro and his backers Instilled a Marxist government In Cuba—
a government that was highly Influenced by Che's own socialist Ideals.
Because of Che's unrelenting pursuit of his socialist agenda, his martyrdom
In the battlefields against imperialism, and the fact that he ultimately refused
to Institutionalize himself In the comfortableness of the upper echelons of
Castro's regime, Che, and not Castro, came to embody the persona of the
"freedom fighter," or "guerrilla," as a key concept grounding the theory
and rhetoric of revolutionary warfare. Arguably, Che's perceived moral stat
ure Is greater than most active socialists In the annals of Marxist revolution
aries because he emphasized most vividly what Karlyn Campbell and Kath
leen Jamleson (1977) Identify as an enactment. According to these authors,
speakers can aid the acceptance of their messages If they can "Incarnate"
their argument and embody "the proof of what Is said" (9). Che did not
merely preach revolution and sacrifice; he exemplified revolution and sac
rifice, and. In so doing, he Inspired the revolutionary action of others.
In Third World Marxist thought, Che had become the representative of
a collective group struggle. Through his life and actions, Che transcended
the various cultures of the Third World by Illustrating how sacrifice and
struggle, coupled with the Marxist belief that liberation through armed strug
gle was historically Inevitable, could bring about better living conditions.
Even In the United States, among people who disagreed with his Marxism
and his tactics, Che Is regarded by some as a folk hero for his devotion to
justice and his relentless pursuit of his humanitarian Inspired Utopian dreams.
Che's editor, John GerassI (1968) explains how Che "was an Idealist, a man
who lived ... a man who died—for other people, for people he never met,
for the poor, for the exploited . .." (1). While Che's Marxism may be dis
credited as a viable political system, his efforts to bring dignity and prosperity
to the Third World ought to be recognized as a reasonable response to the
brutal conditions of Imperialism.
In this study, a single speech by Che Is analyzed for Its justificatory rhetoric
supporting the cause of Third World solidarity and world-wide Marxist rev
olution. While the generallzablllty of conclusions drawn from a single piece
of discourse Is difficult to achieve, the practice serves other heuristic Inter
ests. In particular. It Is unrealistic to draw sweeping statements about the
"nature" of Marxist justificatory discourse based on such a small sample;
however, my role as a critic informs Che's rhetorical strategies so that It Is
possible to recognize the Intrinsic value of Marxist discourse and discourse
communities, even In an era where Marxism Itself Is losing Its competitiveness
In the Ideological marketplace of the world.
The title of Che's address. Itself, Is Indicative of the justificatory techniques
that Che utilizes throughout his discourse. He Identified his address as "On
Our Common Aspiration; The Death of Imperialism and the Birth of a Moral
World." In this title, Che establishes an Important theme that he Is to carry
throughout his address and throughout his struggle as a revolutionary. Much
In the way that the First World bourgeoisie democracies denounce com
munism, Che presents Imperialism as the antithesis of justice and a hindrance
to peace In the Third World. This peace can be purchased only through
unity which alone can bring out Its defeat.
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The address was delivered on February 26,1965, in Algiers for a conference
on African-Asian solidarity." The mid-1960s was a period of great unrest in
Africa and Asia where many nations were starting to emerge as autonomous
after centuries of colonial rule by European powers. Yet this transition was
not to come easy for Africa, Asia, or for Che. Shortly after delivering this
speech, Che, frustrated with the inactivity of a bureaucratic position, severed
his leadership ties to the Cuban government and resumed the role of an
active revolutionary, a decision that lead to his 1967 death in Latin America.
Just as the speech was a call for action and an attempt to achieve solidarity
through struggle, Che, as an enactment of his message, was an impressive
person to advocate Third World solidarity. Specifically, while being an Ar
gentinean, Che fought for the "liberation" of Guatemala, Cuba, the Congo,
and Bolivia and traveled widely in his effort to unite Latin America. Indeed,
Che's actions personified a united Third World. While Marxist ideology was
his method of achieving his Utopian goals, the intent of his effort was ground
ed in a humanitarian sentiment that went beyond the letter and spirit of
Marxist dogma. In his biography of Che, Andrew Sinclair (1970) explains how
Che's entire life was spent in an effort to bring humanitarianism and comfort
to the suffering peoples of the Third World:
When all is said and done, when his words and acts have been coldly seen
and sometimes condemned, the conviction remains that Che was always
driven by his love for humanity and for the good in mankind. The ideals
expressed in his writings, his whole life and his passion and his death, tran
scend ideology (105).
Thus, in analyzing the discourse of Che, or of any other Marxist speaker, it
may perhaps be effective to consider the spirit in which he or she spoke.
The positions of Marxist revolutionaries are often extreme, but then again,
the conditions under which they must work are often incompatible with
sanctioned channels for addressing grievances. Consequently, the oratory
of Che and other Marxist speakers should be studied for the assumptions it
makes about conflicts in the world and judged on how well it mediates those
conflicts.
Assumptions Underlying Marxist Rhetoric
The conditions behind the rise of socialist thought and the development
of Marxist ideology are varied and difficult to trace. However, like the de
velopment of Capitalism and First World political ideology to which Marxism
is a response, the European Enlightenment is a good place to begin exploring
for conceptual clues which shed light on the assumptions Che makes in
ordering his political perceptions. An extremely helpful source for isolating
these clues can be found in Morse Peckham's (1962) study of "tragic vision"
and "identity" in Europe's Enlightenment period.
In particular, Peckham highlights two assumptions from which much so
cialist thought slowly matured. Eor Peckham, the concepts of "cosmic to-
" All citations from this speech come from a translation by Leonard Mades and were
posthumously published in Venceremos!: The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che
Guevara.
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ryism" and "hierarchy of the natural" (75) emerged in the European intel
lectual environment, an environment accepting quasi-scientific paradigms
of social and dialectical progress. While Peckham is speaking in terms of the
larger socialist movement, a movement involving many strands and diverse
factions (like that of the Cuban revolution), Peckham's three concepts ad
equately mirror presumptions found in Che's discourse, presumptions which
helped the argumentation and justification strategies that Che utilized in his
speech.
According to the account of socialist thought advocated in this essay, an
account generative of Che's discourse, the concept of cosmic toryism assumes
that institutionalization and bureaucratization are natural and positive by
products of an organized society. They are a "natural" extension of social
and legal consciousness. More specifically, the tenets of central planning
and other dictatorial controls of society are based on the assumption that,
left to their own devices under the moral sanction of a "free economy,"
people will set up oppressive class structures. The ruling classes will create
a government that refuses to interfere with the workings of a "market econ
omy." In such a system, institutalization and bureaucratization are kept to a
minimum and society is less organized, so that individual freedom can exist
unimpeded by social obligations. Thus, the argumentative base that Che is
working from involves the assumption that the absence of legal conscious
ness and morally created political institutions in the First World has led to
the oppression of the Third World. In his search for a moral world, Che is
trying to organize society in a fundamentally different political paradigm
than that which had existed previously.
The second assumption, the hierarchy of the natural, has more substantial
implications for understanding Che's and other Marxists' discourse. Under
this assumption, the human being is considered inherently perfectible. Yet
this is a material perfection, an earthly perfection, not perfection in the
spiritual world. As a corollary to this assumption, education, which shows
how individuals are enslaved by false ideology, becomes the most important
concern for Marxist speakers, as education is seen a panacea for social ills,
in other words, the educated mind is able to "conform ... to the law of
nature" (75), which, in this case, is represented by the socialist state; this law
of nature is indicative of cosmic toryism—the centrality of the state in socialist
doctrine.
In assuming that people are inherently correctable, Che hoped to bring
about the death of imperialism through the unity of the Third World. Sub
sequent Marxist agitation was designed to shake bourgeois and oppressive
false consciousness from its foundations in the minds of his Third World
audience. Once this oppressive consciousness was acknowledged, then his
oppressed audience could work to construct a new moral world from the
ashes of the old. Under this perspective, Che's central assumption was per
fectibility, an important requirement for the socialist order.^ Without per-
' The entelechy of perfectibility involves important rhetorical considerations, as rec
ognized by Kenneth Burke. For instance, in his "Definition of Man," Burke explains
that man is "rotten with perfection" (16). For Burke, the te/os of people compels them
to create idealist states upon which to ground their motivations. This leads to con-
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fectibility, human beings have no way to grow and learn to adapt their lives
to the socialist "laws of nature." Here is where the overt calls for hostility
in Che's discourse can be found. In Marxist ideology, the principle of per
fectibility grounds Marxist rhetorical apologetics. As Peckham explains, "to
make [Man] perfect, whatever impedes his perfection, his perfect adaptation
to his environment, the way he ought to live, must be destroyed" (75). For
Che and for Marxist rhetoric generally, the ethical code that grounds their
justification of aggression is that the ends justify the means:
[l]f the communist theory of history is scientifically true, therefore the aims
of the communist state are natural. It follows that the rulers of the communist
state are justified in doing anything they think advisable, that is, what their
theory of history tells them is advisable, in bringing about communist ends
(76).
In this brief review, then, I hope to have shed insight on some of the major
assumptions fundamental to Che's speech. In so doing, it should become
clear how cosmic toryism and hierarchy of the natural are meta-ideological
Marxist concepts from which rhetorical argumentation is generated. What
1 have attempted to illustrate is only a small slice of the larger Marxist picture.
This essay is proposed not as an ending, but as a beginning and is intended
to inspire further research on other specific Marxist orators (i.e. Vladimir
Lenin, Fidel Castro, Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh, to name only the most
obvious examples).
Within this limited analysis of Che, many areas of further research suggests
themselves. For instance, it is clear that the title of Che's address offers an
argument with two distinct premises. The first is a premise based in "fact"
in the sense that imperialism is an observable phenomenon with tangible
effects felt by the inhabitants of the Third World. Che's second premise of
his title is grounded in Marxist mythology and is represented by the belief
that there is a negative correlation between imperialism and a moral world.
The use of these premises indicate that Che's entire argumentation structure
has grown out of nineteenth-century Romanticism and "its wholly new
concept of how to deal with history" (Peckham 126). As Enlightenment
presuppositions are still guiding the actions and identities of First World
bourgeois democracies, exploring the relationship between Romanticism
and Marxism may further help us to understand the tensions and conflicts
of the twentieth-century and help us to anticipate the conflicts of the next
century.
While "birth" and "death" metaphors were not new to the nineteenth-
century, the notion that there was a scientifically verifiable social condition
that awaited the "correct" historical crisis to enact itself was a novel con
ception. More specifically, the belief that social conditions could be polit
ically mediated constituted a substantial break from traditional aristocratic
European culture and its reliance on a ridged social hierarchy, one based on
tradictions and tensions within the human individual as this perfectibility can never
be achieved. Ultimately, this stress leads to the dialectical process upon which human
history is negotiated and created.
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divine sanction and privileged property rights. In this sense, Che's arguments
clearly stem from Romanticist thinking and the belief that social systems
should emulate naturalist patterns as represented by observable laws of his
tory. Che's title further serves to unify the thematic structure of his subse
quent argumentation. This is particularly evident in Che's three main topics:
the function of socialism, the moral responsibility of economics, and the
unjust nature of international law. Each of these will now, in turn, be covered
in more specific detail.
Che and the "Nature" of Socialism
In this section, Burkean principles of division, identification, and order will
be utilized to explore Che's explanation of socialism. Furthermore, a Burkean
perspective is helpful in elucidating Che's rhetorical technique for redes-
cribing the problems facing the Third World into Marxist terms with Marxist
solutions.
Che begins his speech by representing Cuba as "the lone voice of the
peoples of Latin America" (378). Cuba has achieved this status through the
strife of revolution. Thus, in the technical sense of Marxist doctrine, Cuba
has been "liberated" and is now governed by a mandate originating with
"the people." From the point of view of a non-Marxist, however, Che's claim
is absurd; non-Marxists fail to appreciate Che's assumption that the people's
of Latin America are voiceless. These people believe that the Latin Americans
speak through the political and economic institutions imposed upon them
by the European powers.
Che's claim is made more rhetorically substantial when it is seen through
the Burkean concept of "ultimate order." For Burke, the perfectibility con
cept is intimately tied to the concept of hierarchy and enteiechy. By the
nature of their symbol systems, human beings seek order in the establishment
of hierarchies. This is particularly evident where Marxism is concerned. For
instance. Burke (1950) observes that "much of the rhetorical strength in
Marxist dialectic comes from the fact that it is 'ultimate' in its order" (190).
By this Burke means that Marxism assumes a political hierarchy that is bu
reaucratic and institutional by nature. In other words, Burke's perspective
helps to collaborate what Peckham defined earlier in this essay as "cosmic
toryism."
More specifically, the fact that Marxist discourse is "ultimate" in its order,
"perfect" in its assumptions about human and historical teios, allows Che, as
spokesperson for the proletariat, to evoke the power of synecdoche in
representing Cuba's interests as the interests of the larger Third World. In
other words, Che's speech illustrates how the Marxist teios represents the
enteiechy of the non-Marxist world. Roderick Flart (1990) elaborates on how
Burke's concept of "ultimate order" is a rhetorical device which invites
synecdoche in Marxist discourse:
The worker worked for the state, the state works for the worker, all worked
for the mother land. As a result, the peasant could perform his menial chores
happily, knowing that he or she wascontributingcf/rect/y to the great historical
drama of communism (350).
In more overtly Burkean terms, the proletariat that Che addresses in his
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speech is "substantially" free to contribute to the historic unfolding of Marx
ism. The oppressed Third World peasant has an uncontaminated vision of
what the world is really like, "where as other classes must protect their
interests by a partial avoidance of the truth, inasmuch as they enjoy their
rights at the expense of others" (CM 356). In his or her direct, unclouded
relationship to "truth," the dedicated Marxist self-consciously represents a
"correct" place in the ultimate order of nature's "just" hierarchy.
For Che and for Marxist discourse generally, the perspective of ultimate
order assumes an a priori knowledge of the human condition as being eco
nomically and historically determined. As a consequence of this assumption,
class struggle becomes a primary notion which serves two rhetorical func
tions. In the first rhetorical function of class struggle, the division between
the classes clearly establishes the relationship between the "haves" and the
"have-nots." According to the Marxist perspective, class struggle is "inev
itable" under the conditions of a "false" political system. Thus, it becomes
morally imperative for people to resist the inequities of their class in order
to expediate the unfolding of the "correct" political state. In the second
rhetorical function of class struggle, speakers can assume an implied tyranny
behind the working class condition. In implying a tyranny behind the con
ditions of a diverse group of people or nations, speakers can cultivate iden
tification among the repressed class and establish a common ground for
collective unity and action.
The principle of identification is a central concept in contemporary rhe
torical theory. Simply stated, identification involves the joining of substantial
interests. In a consubstantial relationship, the perceived commonality be
tween the perspective of the speaker and the desires of the audience are
aligned. Within the sphere of this alignment, persuasion has the potential
to occur. In other words, language and attitudes are made to interact, via
the process of identification, to aid in the mediation of some adverse exi
gence.
In the case of Che's discourse, the exigence he is trying to mediate is
imperialism. For example, under the assumption that the human being is
economically and historically constituted and that, with conscious effort, a
modification of these phenomena can potentially lead to the establishment
of a communist Utopia, Che is able to cultivate identification strategies.
Specifically, in order to transcend the cultural differences of his multi-cul
tural audience, Che proposes the front of "our common aspiration, the death
of imperialism ..." (378). As a Marxist, Che sensed that his multi-cultural
audience demanded a material sense of identification. To accomplish this,
Che makes explicit the connections between his audience's undeserved ill-
fortune and its attributed cause. In this way, identification is cultivated when
Che makes explicit the connection he perceives between colonial oppres
sion and "the struggle against backwardness and poverty" (378). Time and
again, Che returns to this theme when he refers "to the struggle against the
main culprits guilty of our backwardness" (384).
The implication of Che's ideological concerns is that, with the aid of
communist leadership, there will be created "a new society that is rich and
just at the same time" (378). The juxtaposition of "rich" and "just" suggests
that material wealth is unfairly distributed on the planet, an idea presumably
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shared by his impoverished audience. This perspective that Che utilizes to
justify his actions makes more sense when considering Che's definition of
socialism as the "abolishment of man's exploitation of man" (380). In Che's
sense of aggression, the fight against imperialism is simply the lesser of two
evils. Robert Heilbroner (1989) explains how Che's perspective expresses the
humanitarian core of socialist ideology, a sentiment that is often neglected
or overlooked in the tendency for First World nations to amplify the faults
of socialism or to reduce it simply to ineffective economic planning:
"[Socialism] has always meant more than a system of economic organization.
At its core, it has stood for a commitment to social goals that have seemed
incompatible with, or at least unattainable under capitalism—above all, the
moral, not just the material, elevation of humankind" (109).
Understanding this connotation of socialism helps to explain Che's per
ception of the parasitic relationship existing between the First and Third
Worlds and his struggle to redefine that relationship. Early in his speech,
Che explains to his Third World audience that the high standard of living in
dominating countries "is based upon the misery of ours" (378). Che then
utilizes the metaphor of the "imperialist tree" to illustrate how the oppressed
nations are the branches of an imperialistic State (the trunk). On the branches,
one imagines, are the leaves (the proletariat) which labor to collect the
sunlight and transfer it into food and energy for the trunk to grow. In spite
of the fact that the metaphor obviously breaks down at the literal level, Che
argues that a "split" between the leaves and the trunk has advantages for
the Third World.
Che's tree metaphor is a further example of his use of identification through
division. Specifically, rhetoric, as a process, "speaks" to how people become
separated from each other by nature of their symbol systems. People utilize
rhetoric to mediate perceived differences among a discourse community to
achieve a level of consubstantiality between the participants. Sometimes,
however, a speaker has to create that division in order to archive a different
identification among the perceptions of the audience. As Burke explains,
"We must aim at congregation by devices making for segregation—peace is
something we must fight for" (CM 370). Che's tree metaphor is his attempt
to create a division in his audience so that he can promote identification
with his Marxist justification for aggression.
As Third World nations begin to identify with Che's redescription and
learn to think and act with a Marxist vocabulary, they will use violence to
reject the dominance of oppressing First World imperialism. This action of
self-assertion has two important consequences. First, the nations involved
gain independence as they overcome the malignant influence of their Eu
ropean and North American oppressors. Second, and more important for
Che's tree metaphor, the act of revolution gradually weakens the oppressive
imperialist system as further of its resources are cut off. Therefore, Che can
conclude, "A victory of any one country against imperialism is our victory,
just as defeat for any one country is a defeat for all" (379).
While arguing for Third World independence, Che stresses the importance
of solidarity among these nations. Indeed, Che speaks in terms that are
specific for the identification process. He explains, "If there were no other
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factors favoring unity, the common enemy would have to constitute it" (379).
The metaphor he introduces to explain the Third World's rejection of First
World influence is of a "painful birth." This birth is more substantial than
an individual country's liberation, its separation or division from a previously
established economic relationship. Indeed, Che makes it clear that economic
liberation does not really "free" a nation, as class forces and oppression can
appear in any section of the Third World unless precautions are taken and
Marxist identification among the formally oppressed people can be achieved.
Thus, an African-Asian bond is urged in this speech, and a Latin American
bond is assumed. However, according to the Marxist program, consubstan-
tiality does not stop with Third World liberation. Ultimately, a world socialist
order is needed, an order based on a social redefinition of human beings
that is "born" out of revolutionary struggle.^ As Che explains, "Socialism
cannot exist if a change does not take place in man's consciousness, that
evokes a new fraternal attitude towards humanity" (379).
Che's Economic Argument
Che's discussion of socialism and his emphasis on identification, solidarity,
and struggle presents an incomplete picture of Che's revolutionary concerns.
Establishing the immorality of the imperialist defined relationship between
First and Third world nations was an important strategy in the early sections
of Che's speech. Once Che's audience could agree that their current situ
ation was grounded in a tyranny imposed by imperialist powers, they could
then agree to reject that influence. But what alternatives were available for
the Third World? To answer this question, Che, whose official capacity with
the Cuban government was as Minister of Finance, introduces a discussion
of Marxist economics. Particularly, Che denounces the "Law of Value" as
"unequal exchange relations imposjed] on backward countries" (379). To
replace this system, Che proposes that foreign trade "be [made] subordinate
to a fraternal policy towards the different peoples" (380). Lest a reader ca
sually dismiss such remarks as those of a naive rabble-rouser without an
appreciation for economic "reality," Gerassi brings to the reader's attention
the following anecdote:
In the early days, when the United States and Cuba were still trying to find
ways of interaction, Walter Sauer, executive vice president of the Export-
Import Bank, an official arm of the United States Treasury Department, had
occasion to talk with Che about finances. He commented later: "Guevara
knows and understands foreign exchange, balance of payments, etc., and in
fact he understands finance and economics, and he knows exactly where the
hell he is going. ... It was just like talking to another banker, except the son
of a bitch is an orthodox Marxist" (15).
Since Donald McCloskey (1985) illustrated that economics was an argu-
mentatively constructed field of inquiry, rhetoricians have been able to argue
that finance is a rhetorical, and not a social-scientific activity. By seeing
' The birth metaphor functions on two levels: physical liberation and transcendence
to Universal Brotherhood. Che notes that physical liberation is a necessary prerequisite
for transcendence. Transcendence comes from ideological education and embodies
the perfectibility assumption.
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economic matters through a historicist's lens, it becomes clear that econ
omists do not match their theories with the "truth" of commerce, but, rather,
utilize language to construct the ideological parameters of "commerce." As
McCloskey explains, "Economics, like geology or evolutionary biology or
history itself is a historical rather than a predictive science" (xix). In other
words, by seeing economics as a historical discussion, it becomes reasonable
to suggest that the oppressive economic constructs of capitalism and im
perialism are nothing more than the result of human social contingency, a
contingency that can be redefined, altered, or replaced.
Being historically constituted, economics and its study involves humanistic
activity and reasoning, in spite of twentieth century attempts to scientize
economics with the ideology of positivism. For instance, in his book, Mc
Closkey wonders "whether the strident talk of science in economics, which
served well in bringing clarity and rigor to the field, has outlived its useful
nesses" (3). In short, McCloskey argues that economics evolves through
argumentation, and is thus socially constructed. As such, a Third World
critique of First World economics has rhetorical viability. Again, as McClos
key explains, "A rhetorical criticism of economics can perhaps make eco
nomics more modest, tolerant, and self-aware, and improve one of the
conversations of mankind" (53).'
The human power to define social objects through selection and ideo
logical preference enables economic, political or any other conversation to
occur and leads, ideally, to the emergence of a preferable, pragmatic way
of life. However, as many nations of the Third World will contest, they have
been systematically excluded from the social construction of their political
and economic destinies. The First World's marginalization of the Third is the
result of the function of definition. According to Burke, definition involves
the propensity of humans to select and prefer one "way of seeing" over
another. However, definition also implies division and negation, because "[a]
way of seeing is also a way of not seeing—a focus upon object A involves a
neglect of object B" (PC 49).
The distinction created by division and negation allows for the condition
of rhetoric. Between human beings and their "perfect" consubstantiality in
nature is the filter of language. In an important sense, this filter represents
a "fall" which has taken humans out of "Eden" and into the condition of
"Babel." Through language, human beings have forced dissociations upon
each other and upon nature. For instance, the First World has created the
conditions of the Third through economic and imperialist policies. The First
and Third World are essentially in a negative, consubstantial relationship
with the stronger First World living parasitically off the Third. Marxist rhetors
like Che point out the inequity of this relationship and offer a redescription
that has the power to redefine the economic and political relationships
between the First and Third World. In this redefinition, new meaning and
' From the perspective that social and economic institutions are socially created,
Che's demand that international finance be more responsive to the needs of the Third
World is reasonable. If, as McCloskey argues, economics is a "conversation," then the
Marxist dialogue, one that calls for a more humane use of capital, can be a part of
that discourse community.
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consubstantiality can be cultivated. Speakers like Che are only made possible
by conditions that force an artificial division upon human social communities.
As Burke explains, "If men were not apart from each other there would be
no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity" {RM 22).
In proclaiming his idea of Third World unity and Marxist economic viability,
Che is operating from the same sort of ontological position as any First World
economist. More specifically, both Capitalist and Marxist economic struc
tures reflect ideological perspectives and imperatives that taint "objective"
world perceptions. Explaining this idea further, I turn to critic James Kavan-
agh (1990), whose study of ideology in literature presents a critical rationale
which helps explain how both Che and First World economists share similar
ontological grounding:
[TJhere is no such thing as a social discourse that is nonideological Ide
ology is a social process that works on and through every social subject, that,
like any other social process, everyone is "in," whether or not they "know"
or understand it (311).®
In other words, economic talk grows out of and extends from ideological
perspectives. These perspectives result from social processes grounded in
historical contingencies. Ideological perspectives involve the symbol-using
animal's ability to select and emphasize certain characteristics of "reality"
and to deflect others. In this sense, ideology is, in many ways, essentially
rhetorical. This relationship between ideology and rhetoric is concisely ex
plained by Burke:
[Ideology has come to represent] a system of political or social ideas, framed
and propounded for an ulterior purpose. In this new usage, "ideology" is
obviously but a kind of rhetoric (since the ideas are so related that they have
in them, either explicitly or implicitly, inducements to some social and po
litical choices rather than others) {RM 88).
The point drawn from this discussion of Burke and Kavanagh is that the
question of "economics" implies the question of how to structure the social
patterns of a community. In other words, economics involves strategic cho-
icemaking at the societal level. Economists emphasize and deemphasize
different aspects of "reality" in order to deduce corresponding ideological
or political conclusions. Economists do this in much the same way as speakers
do when they generate rhetorical discourse. While economics may not be
reducible to rhetoric, it is epistemic in that it is constituted by linguistic
functions and ideological considerations. Seen in this light, Che's Third World
challenge to First World economics is simply an attempt to question the
usefulness of the assumptions which ground finance. In questioning these
assumptions, Che opens the conversation to a larger audience and raises the
potential for constructive change.
' Kavanagh further illustrates how the connection between ideology and rhetoric
produces a type of meta-discourse with which to create and control social reality. He
explains that ideology "has the function of producing an obvious 'reality' that social
subjects can assume and accept, precisely as if it had not been socially produced and
did not have to be 'known' at all" (311). This reality becomes socially justified through
rhetorical processes such as identification, amplification, and dissociation.
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Fundamentally, Che interjects into the ongoing economic conversation a
moralist dictum. He asserts that answers to economic questions can be found
along the lines of humanist concerns. Humanism, in Che's use of the term,
serves as a heuristic for interpreting and creating economic reality. In this
vein, Che argues that human beings can "begin a new era of authentic
international division of labor based not on the history of what has been
done until now but on the future history of what can be done" (381).
Che's critique of First World economics, then, is a way of rhetorically
mediating the social fabric of the Third World to reconstitute the integrity
and value of its citizens. Che is not the first thinker to consider this process.
In his history of the humanist tradition, Ernesto Grassi (1980) explains that
rhetoricity is the center of all attempts by people to redescribe themselves.
Grassi writes, "Rhetorical language is the ground of historicity of man who
develops himself in the society" (54). McCloskey reaches a similar conclusion
when he states that "[a]ll science is humanism because that is all there is for
humans" (57). In the sense that, as a Marxist, Che wants to make more human
use of technology, his justificatory position is closely aligned with that of
Grassi and McCloskey. The difference between Che and other humanists,
such as Grassi and McCloskey, is that Che's effort is an attempt to redescribe
the economic relationship between the First and Third world in a way that
the First World is unaccustomed to accept.
Che and the Justification of Hostility
In the previous section, definition, division, and negation where discussed
in relationship to ideology and how this related to perceptions of economics.
Che spent much effort in his speech to offer an alternative ideological frame
work to rework perceptions of economics among members of the Third
World. His speech was an attempt to redescribe the world in terms more
supportive of humanitarian interests. He criticized the First World for uti
lizing finance and technology in a way that unfairly distributed the work
load on the planet and disproportionately dispersed the world's wealth. In
Che's speech, the above were common Marxist themes. Che covered them
but did not dwell on them because, as the history of First World oppression
illustrates, the Marxist ideas of Che and others had already provoked an
armed response by the First World. Thus, a more pressing issue than eco
nomic redescription facing the emergence of a Third World socialist identity
was the threat of open hostility with the First World. The remainder of this
essay studies Che's rhetorical mediation of the military threat posed by the
First World.
This section explores how Che, a man committed to humanitarian goals,
could advocate, design, and participate in overt revolutionary (violent) ac
tivity. For instance, one dominant way in which Che clearly does this is to
create a strong We/They dichotomy and attribute to the First World blame
for the insuing conflict between the First and Third Worlds. Che's example
supports Ivie's (1980) observation that, "people strongly committed to the
ideal of peace, but simultaneously faced with the reality of war, must believe
that the fault for any such disruption of their ideals lies with others" (280).
This was precisely the same rhetorical tactic that the First World imperialistic
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nations utilized in justifying their violence toward the Third World. For
example, Ivie points out that, in the Vietnam war, "[tjhe enemy, not the
United States, was associated with the physical devastation, atrocities, and
personal tragedies that characterize any war" (281). Che engaged in a similar
strategy in order to reconcile his pursuit of a united Third World, an activity
which promoted humanist concerns while engaging in deliberate violence.
In short, Che's pursuit of justice did not preclude the use of violence to
achieve this end.
A closer examination of Che's reasoning reveals how his concepts of "jus
tice" and "violence" are related to each other in his argument. For instance,
central to Che's position is his assertion that International Law, a law fre
quently evoked against the struggles of the Third World, is unjust. Thus,
because First World nations have formed a union, as represented by the
political construction of International Law, it follows that the union of Third
World socialist countries is necessary for mutual survival against First World
oppression, an oppression that has been frequently sanctified by Interna
tional "Law."
The union between the different nations of the Third World is necessary
if a "just" Third World is to be created. This union may necessarily involve
violence, as First World nations resist and protest their loss of oppressive
power. In other words, by first distinguishing between an unjust International
Law and the potentiality of a united Third World consolidated in its oppo
sition, Che's discourse and aggressive policies work toward the day of "jus
tice" when a "true" International Law can be erected, one which represents
the interest of the Third World as well as the First. While Che's discourse
and political policies can functionally take place on the political level, the
threat of violence is evoked because hostile relations with the non-socialist
world are unavoidable. Therefore, a socialist army is needed to establish
national independence and national laws and to force the First World to
comply with Third World national rights.
Che's technique for promoting the argument that force is morally nec
essary to resist the pressures of imperialism corresponds to Ivie's (1982)
observation that "[pjrowar rhetors perform the ritual of victimage as they
cultivate images of a savage enemy" (241). More specifically, Che's speech
provides an excellent example of how prowar speakers evoke the ritualistic
victimage that Ivie identifies:
Through analogical extensions, they articulate a theme of diabolism that,
taken literally, goads nations into defending themselves against barbarians
bent upon subjugating innocent peoples (241).
Che most clearly utilizes this technique when he attacks an International
Law "that was created as a result of the conflicts among imperialist powers
and not as a result of disputes among free, just peoples" (386). Such law,
Che reminds his audience, leads to the unwanted establishment of First
World foreign bases on Third World sovereign territory and to the accu
mulation of a tremendous foreign debt created by an imposed economic
system.
An evaluation of Ivie's (1974) study makes Che's argument more pertinent.
Ivie points out that what First World nations consider to be International
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Law is little more than the establishment of the privileged rights of these
nations. For example, America defines war "in purpose terms, with territorial
invasion and commercial injuries interpreted as attacks against America's
rights" (343). Yet, as history illustrates, the United States has been seldom
invaded but has been involved in countless international conflicts that were
resolved through the use of the armed forces. This phenomenon can be
explained by the U.S. practice of equating "territorial invasion" with "com
mercial injuries." So-called commercial injuries, then, serve to justify Amer
ican acts of aggression in defense of foreign owned property which, by proxy,
have been transformed into an extension of American soil. Therefore, the
confiscation and nationalization of industry and the collection of foreign
owned or operated property, which automatically follows the socialist ascent
to state power, is defined by the United States as a situation where military
action is warranted even though there is no direct threat to the actual land
or persons of the U.S. United States Marine Corps Major Harries-Clichy
Peterson (1961) clearly details the application of this warrant:
[Tjhe precedent was established that [military action] did not constitute an
act of war. Functions assumed by the Marines ashore after overcoming re
sistance and protecting the lives and property of U.S. citizens included the
disarming of natives, the training of a constabulary, and the supervision of
elections (xxii).
In other words, the property rights of the United States extends to foreign
territory, territory that was taken by force in the first place. Notice, fur
thermore, how the U.S. precedent included not only the refurbishment of
North American property in the Third World, but included also the disarming
of such nations and the establishment of puppet, usually dictatorial, regimes.
Had some nation, like Cuba, done this to Florida, the act would be regarded
by the United States as an act of war. In terms of United States foreign policy,
however, the use of aggression against sovereign Third World nations is
justified. The rationale for such military action is cited by Peterson. He refers
to a Marine handbook, the Small Wars Manual:
The use of the forces of the United States in foreign countries to protect the
lives and property of American citizens resident in those countries does not
necessarily constitute an act of war . . . (xxii).
The Small Wars Manual, in turn, attributes justification for this form of
aggression "to international law, as recognized by the leading nations of the
world ..." (xxi). In other words, the First World imperialist nations, as ex
emplified by the United States, has posited a circular argument. Aggression
against Third World nations is justified to protect First World interests, in
terests which depend upon forcing an economic system on the native pop
ulation. This justification is based on First World domestic property laws
which do not take into consideration the norms and customs of the Third
World. Finally, the whole argument is rationalized by appealing to Inter
national Law—a code of ethics and behavior which reflects the interests of
the First World.
As a result of the above discussion it should be clear that, when Che speaks
against International Law, he is not speaking as a barbarian interested in
anarchy and destruction for its own sake, but as a diplomat demanding
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respect for the borders of his nation and for all Third World nations. Arguing
from the premise that International Law is unjust, Che is free, as Ivie (1982)
notices, to "establish a 'realistic' image of the enemy's savagery in order to
eliminate peace as a viable alternative to war" (253). Because of the unrea
sonableness of the First World enemy to respect the natural borders and
indigenous cultures of the Third World, the concepts of "justice" and "vi
olence" become associated terms; the goal of justice becomes ultimately
tied with prolonged struggle and violent reaction against the imperialist
nations. Thus, justice through violence becomes a viable reasoning tool in
Che's argumentative repertoire. In Che's speech, then, we find an example
of Marxist rhetoric that provides rationale for a prolonged and hostile conflict
with the First World. Ivie (1974) elaborates on how this process works:
As the individual justifies actions that have been questioned by significant
others, he learns the answers that his society accepts as legitimate motives.
Internalized, these answers form vocabularies of motives that influence the
social actor's world views (338).
In other words, Che's objective in this speech, aside from the larger ob
jectives of the socialist agenda, is to help his audience understand the reasons
behind his Marxist policies. He does this by grounding his policies, partic
ularly ones of aggression, in the motives of his audience. In naming these
motives, he empowers them, gives them form and direction. This concept
explains how the audience determines what is to be considered a persuasive
appeal or even an argument. For example, a First World audience member
who supports an imperialist foreign policy would not recognize Che's ar
guments as legitimate. Indeed, much global conflict since the Second World
War can be reduced to the unrest generated between First and Third world
political ideologies and their inability to recognize each other as legitimate.
From the perspective of rhetorical theory, it is clear that persuasion pro
gresses from an established position in the minds of a particular audience.
This position is modified by the persuader in a manner that continues to
support the premises determined or accepted by that audience. In exactly
this way, Che's oratory is constructed. Consequently, Che's rhetorical and
political position should not be seen as an anomaly in world politics or
oratory. Rather, Che and his Marxist informed discourse must instead be
viewed as a clear expression of human social consciousness, a perspective
determined and sanctioned by his Third World audience.
Conclusion
Major Ernesto "Che" Guevara's speech, delivered to encourage political
solidarity between Third World African and Asian countries, was studied for
its techniques in justifying his socialist call to action, an action which involved
concepts of aggression, victimage, and purification. In this sense, "The Death
of Imperialism and the Birth of a Moral World" contained typical examples
of themes and appeals found in much Marxist discourse of the time. More
specifically, in studying Che's discourse, I have illustrated how he utilized
processes of identification, division, and perfectibility to ground his assump
tions and to aid in the acceptance of his argumentative appeals.
Of greater critical importance, however, is the value of this criticism in
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relationship to a post-Marxist world. In actuality, Che's particular rhetorical
strategies are of only limited interest to rhetorical scholars now that almost
thirty years have passed since his death and the intellectual force of Marxist
thought has been replaced in the academy by post-structuralist apoliticalism.
Specifically, while Che, himself, may be of only marginal interest, his rhe
torical stance, in relationship to imperialism, and his justification of that
stance, is still quite important in a world where the Marxist challenge has
diminished in importance.
The most important point to be drawn from the experience of this critique
is extremely significant to the world culture which is emerging out of the
progress and ruins of the twentieth-century. While the social influence of
speakers like Che wane, and while Third World nations begin to struggle
against the demands of the twenty-first century, demands which include
feeding a bulging population, disease control, famine and deforestation, it
remains important to consider the political and economic forces to which
Che and his Marxist discourse were responding: First World oppression in
the Third World. I faithfully submit that, when the question of oppression
is finally answered, the struggles of the Third World can be moved a step
foreword toward a beneficial resolution.
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Abstract
The events surrounding Jimmy Swaggart's sexual relations with a prostitute
made for an especially interesting case study which involved the integration
of compliance-gaining strategies and elements of the genre of apologia. The
Reverend Jimmy Swaggart endeavored to manage conflict, reduce disso
nance, and institute damage control in an effort to repair his character and
ministry by delivering a speech of apologia broadcast on February 21, 1988.
In this speech, Swaggart effectively utilized several rhetorical strategies and
avoided addressing any specifics of his sexual misconduct.
Several findings emerged from assessing Jimmy Swaggart's compliance-
gaining apologia: (1) He went beyond the purpose of a true religious con
fession. (2) The speech evidenced an intent to persuade, manage conflict,
reduce dissonance, and to implement damage control. (3) Swaggart applied
strategies of compliance-gaining and apologia as manipulative rhetorical tools,
and, (4) Finally, Swaggart's speech demonstrated the use of compliance-gain
ing apologia as a sub-genre. Swaggart's compliance-gaining apologia was ini
tially successful, and his ministry survived his first sexual crisis. Subsequently,
Swaggart was forced to resign from his ministry in October 1991 following
his liaison with another prostitute.
The study of conflict and its management is diverse in that it involves many
academic disciplines, sub-disciplines, and specific situations. One aspect of
this diversity can be found in the revelations regarding television evangelists
such as Jim and Tammy Fae Bakker, Oral Roberts, and jimmy Swaggart. The
speech selected for this evaluation was one delivered by pentecostal preach
er Jimmy Swaggart whose 1988 fall from grace placed him in the position of
an individual who must justify himself and re-establish his credibility with
his constituency.
Knowing that televangelism is a multi-million dollar operation and that
Jimmy Swaggart was at that time the backbone of Swaggart's television min
istry, important questions surface: Was his public apology solely for the
purpose of a religious confession? Was the purpose of the speech one of
expressing regret to his congregation? Was money an issue? Did Swaggart
sense that without a public apology his donations would continue to decline
drastically? Or was it a speech aimed at apology and/or forgiveness with a
final goal of compliance-gaining so that the ministry could continue its multi-
million dollar operation?
Whatever his motivation, Jimmy Swaggart decided to speak to his con
gregation, and millions of television viewers concerning his involvement
with Debra Murphree, a prostitute from the Big Easy, in an effort to manage
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 30, Nos. 1-4 (1993), 19-31.
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conflict, reduce dissonance, repair his character, and rebuild the ministry
which his sexual dalliances damaged.
The effects arising out of the publication of Swaggart's sexual relations
with Debra Murphree make for an especially interesting case study that
involves the integration of compliance-gaining strategies and theoretical
aspects of the genre of apologia. We contend that Swaggart fused these two
rhetorical acts during his speech and formed a sub-genre of compliance-
gaining apologia; he applied these strategies with intent to persuade his
audience. This study was a further investigation involving the subject matter
of a previous article that posited the fusion of political apologia and com
pliance-gaining. The present work examined compliance-gaining apologia
in a religious modality in order to add credibility to the previously proposed
sub-genre concept.^
Interrelating Elements of Genre: A Sub-Genre
The idea of genre, traditionally associated with literary criticism, has
emerged as a concept associated with rhetorical discourse. Edwin Black
helped to concretize the concept in the area of rhetorical theory. Black
defined genre as "... congregations of rhetorical discourses that share similar
strategies, situations, and effects."^ Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall
Jamieson subsequently defined genre as "... a classification based on the
fusion and interrelation of elements in such a way that a unique kind of
rhetorical act is created"^ and argued that a genre is given its character by
a "... fusion of forms, not by its individual elements."" Rhetorical acts in a
particular genre tend to be classified or categorized according to settings,
reasons for production, and elements that are motivational precedents char
acterizing the specific genre. The rhetorical discourse exhibits the situational,
or motivational features of the genre. Strategies, situational factors, overlap
ping functions, and the interrelation of elements play an important role in
the effectiveness of a particular rhetorical act regardless of its genre.
This study contends that when an interrelationship and/or fusion of two
distinctly different genre exists during one particular discourse, a sub-genre
is formed, in Swaggart's rhetorical discourse, he exhibited motivational and
situational features of two unique rhetorical acts, apologia and compliance-
gaining. The following discussion will examine the strategies and elements
involved in apologia and compliance-gaining, that merged together in this
case study and formed a sub-genre. The analyses will include: (1) A review
and discussion of the major works and strategies involved in the genre of
apologia; (2) A review and discussion of the major works and strategies of
compliance-gaining discourse; and, (3) An assessment of jimmy Swaggart's
' Christa L. Arnold and Dean Fadely, "You're No jack Kennedy: Bentsen Vs. Quayle."
Speaker and Cave/ 28 (1991); pp. 38-49.
' Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method, (Madison, Wisconsin: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) p. 134.
' Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Form and Genre, (Falls Church,
Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1976) p. 25.
" Form and Genre., p. 21.
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nationally televised speech of apology' applying theoretical elements of
compliance-gaining apologia.
Apologia
Ware and Linkugel argued that apologetical discourses constitute "... a
distinct form of public address... a strategic verbal defense where the rhetor
fashions to extricate himself from the situation."' Subsequently, Noreen
Kruse defined the genre of apologia as:
A grouping of speeches based on situations and circumstances surrounding
a speech defending one's character, and mending of one's ethos .. . Dis
courses can only be defined as apologia if the rhetor's actions have led to
public criticism of their characters or if the rhetors believe their behaviors
have caused people to consider them immoral or unethical.'
' Sponsored by Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, Baton Rouge Louisiana. Televised speech
delivered by Jimmy Swaggart. Broadcast date, February 21,1988. References to Swag-
gart's speech of apology are from a video tape recording of this speech.
' B.L. Ware and Will A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the
Generic Criticism of Apologia," Quarteriy Journal of Speech 59 (1973): p. 275.
' Noreen W. Kruse, "Motivational Factors in Non-Denial Apologia," Central States
Speech Journal 28 (1977): p. 13. "The Scope of Apologetic Discourse: Establishing
Generic Parameters," Southern Speech Communication Journal 46 (1981): p. 280. Noreen
Kruse's research shed some insight concerning the fine line between a religious
confession and a speech of apology: "It is conceivable, of course, that a religious
confession can serve an apologetic function when the author is a public figure with
a tarnished reputation, but the purpose of the true religious confession is not the
attainment of pardon or acquittal from one's fellow human being... . Implicit in the
religious confession is the notion of God's absolution, not humanity's, and those who
believe themselves to have been forgiven by God have no need to justify or excuse
their behaviors to society." (Emphasis ours); For further evaluations and discussions of
apologia, see: B.L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves:
On the Generic Criticism of Apologia"; B.L. Jackson Harrell, B.L. Ware, and Wil A.
Linkugel, "Failure of Apology in American Politics: Nixon on Watergate," Commu
nication Monographs 42 (1975): pp. 245-261; Edwin Black, Rhetoricai Criticism: A Study
in Method,; Campbell and Jamieson, Form and Genre; Ellen Reid Gold, "Political Ap
ologia; The Ritual of Self-Defense," Communication Monographs 45 (1978): pp. 306-
316; Bernard Brock and Robert Scott, A Twentieth-Century Criticism, (Detroit: Wayne
State University Press, 1980); Robert L. King, "Transforming Scandal into Tragedy: A
Rhetoric of Political Apology," Quarteriy Journal of Speech 71 (1985): pp. 289-301;
Sonja K. Foss, fihetorical Criticism Expioration and Practice, (Prospect Heights, Illinois:
Waveland Press, 1989, pp. 111-121.) Suzanne E. Lindsey, "Saints Facing Scandal: A
Rhetorical Comparison of the Apologia Employed by Aimee Semple McPherson and
James Bakker," Studies in Popuiar Cuiture 13 (1990): pp. 1-16. Sharon D. Downey, "The
Evolution of the Rhetorical Genre of Apologia," Western Journal of Communication 57
(1993); pp. 42-64. For an account of generic criticism in general and Apologia in
specific, the reader is referred to Foss (1989).
Harrell, Ware and Linkugel (1975) discussed apologia as a strategic verbal defense
in which the "rhetor fashions to extricate himself from the situation" (p. 246). These
authors contended that personal legitimacy is most basically grounded in "perceived
honesty, largely a moral perception of the rhetor drawn by the public" (p. 260). Ware
and Linkugel (1973) suggested that questioning a man's moral nature and worth as a
human being is qualitatively different from challenging his policies. Therefore, an
attack on a person's character, moral nature, and reputation requires a direct response
(p. 274). Usually this direct response is in the form of a public address involving
elements such as self defense, apology, and an emphasis on the positive aspects of
this person's character. Foss (1989) indicated that all rhetorical genres including ap
ologias, are constellations containing three elements labeled situational requirements,
substantive and stylistic characteristics, and organizing principles (pp. 111-112).
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The varying strategies, situations, and circumstances surrounding apologia
help make each one unique. However, regardless of the extent of their
individuality, all apologias rely upon the use of four strategies: denial, bol
stering, differentiation, and transcendence." These strategies may be used
separately, simultaneously, or they may overlap one another.
The discourse of denial consists of the "... simple disavowal by the speaker
of any participation in, relationship to, or positive sentiment toward whatever
it is that repels the audience."' Bolstering as a component of apologia is
applied when a "... speaker attempts to identify himself with something
viewed favorably by the audience."^" Differentiation "... subsumes those
strategies which serve the purpose of separating some fact, sentiment, object
or relationship from some larger context within which the audience pres
ently views that attribute."" It often surfaces in apologia when the accused
requests a forbearance of judgment until after the questionable actions are
examined from a different perspective. The final strategy of apologia is tran
scendence, which is the obverse of differentiation, and is transformative in
the sense that strategies involving "... a change in cognitive identification
and in meaning factor together as transcendence."" When implementing
the above strategies, rhetors can assume any or all of the following four
rhetorical tactics: absolution, vindication, explanation, or justification." The
tactic of absolution combines differentiation and denial strategies, with an
objective of acquittal. The vindication tactic relies heavily upon transcen
dence and is aimed at preserving the speaker's reputation. It highlights the
speaker's worth as a human being. With the explanation approach, the rhetor
contends that if the audience truly understands and believes the speaker's
motives and actions, then the audience will support acquittal. Finally, with
the justification tactic, the speaker goes beyond addressing motives and
actions and asks for complete approval."
As apologia involves a rhetor's attempt to reverse the effects of a derog
atory charge thus resulting in a more favorable view of the speaker's char
acter, elements of manipulation and compliance-gaining appear in most
speeches of apology. Accordingly, we should examine the characteristics,
strategies, and situational appropriateness of the rhetorical acts of compli
ance-gaining.
' Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves," pp. 276-282.
' Robert P. Abeison, Theories of Cognitive Consistency, (Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally,
1969, pp. 344-345.) For an example of apologia using denial strategies see: Clarence
□arrow's "They Tried to Get Me" speech in Arthur Weinberg's, Attorney for the
Damned, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957, pp. 494-531).
" Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On Generic Criticism
of Apologia," p. 277. Effective usage of the bolstering strategy was applied in Senator
Edward Kennedy's "Chappaquiddick" address.
" Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves," p. 278.
" Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves," p. 280. Psycholog
ically speaking, transcendence moves the audience away from the particular and most
likely negative charge at hand.
" Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves," pp. 282-283.
" Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves," pp. 282-283.
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Compliance-Gaining Strategies
Compliance-gaining strategies have developed as a specialized area of
study in interpersonal communication research. However in this analysis,
compliance-gaining strategies are useful in a specific public discourse situ
ation. Compliance-gaining can be described as symbolic behavior aimed
towards shaping or regulating the behavior and/or opinion of others." Com
pliance-gaining techniques have also been described as a verbal choice-
making strategies that can play a key role in communication. There are a
variety of situations in which a speaker seeks compliance from the listeners.
This compliance-gaining act may take the form of a request, or "favor asking,"
but, regardless of how the act is presented, the structure is self-serving."
Compliance-gaining, like apologia, is also a fusion of elements and strategies
to form a created communication act. While compliance-gaining is depen
dent on individual circumstances and therefore may apply different strat
egies according to situational needs, compliance-gaining behavior centers
upon an attempt on the part of the communication source to effect a pre
conceived response from the target or receiver of the persuasive effort."
Although the speaker may sometimes consciously choose a message strategy
in order to receive a desired response, such is not always the case. As
Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman, and Georgacarakos have indicated;
While we cannot claim that goal specificity is a characteristic of all compliance-
gaining episodes, we argue that it is an important determinant of effective
ness."
Gerald Marwell and David Schmitt were pioneers in the investigation of
strategies to be applied in compliance-gaining situations." Together they
developed sixteen compliance-gaining strategies. The strategies of compli
ance-gaining most relevant to this discussion extend beyond the dyadic
encounter, and are geared more toward the group or large audience. These
compliance strategies are based upon sanction (promise, ingratiation, posi
tive esteem, aversive stimulation, and guilt), and need (altruism and expla
nation)."
Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman, and Georgacarokos also helped define these
specific compliance techniques. Strategies based on sanction have the com
monality of reward and punishment—the proverbial carrot and stick. Prom
ise consists of promising goods, and/or services in exchange for compliance.
" Karen Tracy, Robert T. Craig, Martin Smith, and Frances Spisak, "The Discourse
of Requests: Assessment of a Compliance-Gaining Approach," Human Communication
Research 10 (1984): pp. 513-538.
" Tracy, et. al.
" Gerald R. Miller and Mark Steinberg, Between People, (Chicago: Science Research
Associates, 1975).
"William J. Schenck-Hamlin, Richard L. Wiseman, and G.N. Georgacarakos, "A
Model of Properties of Compliance-Gaining Strategies," Communication Quarterly 30
(1982): p. 93.
" Gerald Marwell and Davie R. Schmitt, "Dimensions of Compliance-Gaining Be
havior: An Empirical Analysis," Sociometry 39 (1967): 350-364.
" Marwell and Schmitt, pp.357-358.
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basically stating, "if you comply, I will reward you"^\ Ingratiation is a strategy
of sanction in which offers of goods and/or services precedes the request
for compliance. The purpose of this compliance tactic is to manipulate the
target's behavior by offering gift giving, supportive listening, love and af
fection, and favor doing in return for compliance." The strategy of positive
esteem constitutes a case in which the speaker promises an increase in the
target's power, success, moral/ethical status, attention and affection, and
competence." Positive esteem basically states that people you value will
think better of you if you comply. Unless the recipient is a masochist, aversive
stimulation is a strategy of sanction which consists of punishment only—the
stick without the carrot. The speaker continuously punishes target, making
cessation contingent on compliance based on behaviors such as: pouting,
sulking, crying, acting angry, whining, the silent treatment, and ridicule."
The final sanction strategy, guilt, consists of a situation in which the target's
failure to comply with the speaker will result in automatic decreases of self-
worth. The guilt strategy would basically be manipulated as: people will think
you are inadequate if you do not comply. Areas of inadequacy might include
professional ineptness, social irresponsibility, or ethical/moral transgres
sions."
Although many compliance-gaining strategies are based on sanction, there
are also strategies built on need. Altruism is a need strategy in which the
speaker requests the target to engage in behavior designed to benefit the
speaker rather than the target, (ie: "I need your compliance very badly, so
do it for me)." Intensity of the appeal may be manipulated by making the
target feel unselfish, generous, self-sacrificing, heroic, or helpful. "It would
help me if you would do this," and "do a favor for me," exemplify the direct
approach of the altruistic strategy." The final need strategy, explanation,
suggests that: one of several reasons are typically advanced for believing
or doing something. A reason may include: (1) credibility, "I know from
experience." The reason for complying is because of trustworthiness, in
tegrity, exemplary action, or expertise; or (2) inference from empirical evi
dence, "everything points to the logic of this step" therefore, comply."
" Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman, and Georgacarokos, p. 95.
" Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman, and Georgacarokos, p. 95.
" Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman, and Georgacarokos, p. 95.
" Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman, and Georgacarokos, p. 95.
" Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman, and Georgacarokos, p. 95.
" Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman, and Georgacarokos, p. 95.
" For further discussion on compliance-gaining strategies see: Franklin J. Boster,
and James B. Stiff, "Compliance-Gaining Message Selection Behavior," Human Com
munication Research 10, (1984), pp. 539-556; Michael J. Cody, and Margaret L. Mc
Laughlin, "Perceptions of Compliance-Gaining Situations: A Dimensional Approach,"
Communication Monographs 47 (1980), pp. 132-148; Michael ]. Cody, William ]. Jordan,
and Mary Lou Woelfel, "Dimensions of Compliance-Gaining Situations," Human Com
munication Research 9 (1983): 99-113; Mark A. deTurk, "A Transactional Analysis of
Compliance-Gaining Behavior: Effects of Noncompliance, Relational Contexts, and
Actor's Gender," Human Communication Research 72(1985): pp. 54-78; James P. Dillard,
and Michael Burgoon, "Situational Influences on the Selection of Compliance-Gaining
Messages: Two Tests of the Predictive Utility of The Cody-McLaughlin Typology,"
Communication Monographs 52 (1985), pp. 289-304; Marwell and Schmitt, "Dimensions
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The literature treating apologia and compliance-gaining indicates that the
effectiveness of each strategy varies depending on individual and situational
differences. With apologia, the sense of preserving one's character appears
to be a primary motive, however, some apologetic rhetoric may go beyond
self-preservation. Swaggart seemingly selected strategies for his speech with
the intent to apologize and gain compliance from his audience in order to
remain in his ministry. Therefore, the strategies of compliance-gaining and
apologia may be effective in certain public discourse contexts.
Compliance-Gaining Apologia: A Sub-Genre
Noreen Kruse suggested that a public oration of apology contains inten
tions not only to repair damaged ethos and morality, but is also an obvious
step towards gaining respect and therefore compliance from the audience.^'
A rhetor may target compliance as the primary goal using a mixture of
strategies such as denial, aversive stimulation, or the acknowledgement of
error, fault, or even guilt (mea culpa), as a method of self-preservation. Is it
possible that strategies of apologia and compliance-gaining overlap and
therefore are mutually inclusive? The genre of apologia has a legitimate
historical acceptance, whereas compliance-gaining is a reasonably new area
of rhetorical analyses research.
We contend that the strategies and interrelating elements of apologia and
compliance-gaining discussed in this paper constitute a particular form, or
sub-genre, and we would argue that the previous discussion of apologia and
compliance-gaining support this contention. Additional support for our po
sition may be achieved through our evaluation of Jimmy Swaggart's public
oration of apology focusing upon his strategies. There are distinct instances
in Swaggart's oration where he combined compliance-gaining strategies such
as aversive stimulation and guilt; while also using the apologia tactics of
differentiation and transcendence in order to verbally acknowledge his sin
while cognitively moving his audience away from further discussion of his
sin. We offer such an assessment in Swaggart's speech in order to better
understand the interrelationships between apologia and compliance-gaining
discourses.
"GOD HATES THE PORNOGRAPHERS, AND THE ADULTERERS, AND THE
FORNICATORS"
—JIMMY SWAGGART
of Compliance-Gaining"; Schenck-Hamlin, et.al., "A Model of Properties of Compli
ance-Gaining Strategies"; Clark and Delia, "Topoi and Rhetorical Competence"; Karen
Tracy, Robert T. Craig, Martin Smith and Frances Spisak, "The Discourse of Requests:
Assessment of a Compliance-Gaining Approach," Human Communication Research 10
(1984): pp. 513-538; William J. Schenck-Hamlin, G.N. Georgacarakos, and Richard L.
Wiseman, "A Formal Account of Interpersonal Compliance-Gaining," Communication
Quarterly 30 0982): pp. 173-180; M. Lee Williams, and Nancy K. Untermeyer, "Com
pliance-Gaining Strategies and Communicator Role: An Analysis of Strategy Choices
and Persuasive Efficacy," Communication Research Reports 5 (1988): 10-18.
Kruse, "The Scope of Apologetic Discourse: Establishing Generic Parameters," p.
279.
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Standing before a church filled to capacity, and with his family, as well as
millions of television viewers watching, Jimmy Swaggart began his confession
with an admission of guilt: "I do not plan to white wash my sin ... I have
no one to blame but myself... Sin was done in secret, blessed be the name
of the Lord." While there is no logical connection between sin, (whether it
be done in secret or in public), and "blessed be the name of the Lord,"
there is a psychological relevance. Placing an emphasis on the Lord and
carrying a bible in his hand helped differentiate Jimmy Swaggart the human
minister, from Jesus Christ the Lord, (e.g., "I have had to come to the real
ization, this Gospel is flawless even though it is ministered, at times, by flawed
men." [Emphasis Ours.] Swaggart continued his speech by bolstering the
media, a tactic opposite his usual approach," calling them fair, correct, and
even objective. Although Swaggart obviously was confessing to having com
mitted some kind of sinful activities, he neither admitted to, nor described,
his specific sin. As his entire speech neither addressed the exact nature of
his sin with a prostitute, nor how long he had been committing sin, Swaggart
actually was using a form of denial in that he never directly commented upon
the exact nature of his transgressions.
Alfred North Whitehead observed: "It takes a very unusual mind to un
dertake an analysis of the obvious." At the risk of belaboring the obvious,
the concept of audience analysis inherent in our phrase "a form of denial"
is important. Had Swaggart used denial per se, he would have said something
akin to "I was not in that motel room to have sex with a prostitute, but
rather, like our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, I was there to give her spiritual
guidance." As Swaggart was constrained from using this form of denial, he
chose, and wisely we would argue, to allude to having sinned but not to
specify the exact nature of those wrong doings—wrong doings which would
have been repugnant to his congregation. Thus, Swaggart adapted the strat
egy of denial, as well as the other strategies of apologia, to fit his particular
circumstances.
Swaggart addressed those whom he had wronged, beginning with his wife,
Frances. During the speech, Swaggart looked directly at Frances, constantly
bolstering and ingratiating her by stating that "God could not have blessed
a man with a better woman than my wife." He let the audience know that
Frances' redeemer was and is the Lord Jesus Christ, thus transcending the
audience away from Swaggart and his sin in question.
Swaggart spoke to Frances saying: "I have sinned against you and I beg for
your forgiveness." Frances, while not crying or smiling, did not look happy;
she made a hesitant nod, certainly not an obvious gesture of compliance let
alone complete forgiveness. However, by identifying his wife as an ideal,
Swaggart made it difficult for her to react negatively. By idealizing his wife
and marriage, he identified with highly esteemed audience values; thereby,
not only bolstering her image, but, by association his own. Thus Swaggart
transcended his breach of promise.
" In the past, Swaggart had been a media basher, and his subsequent speeches
exemplified a return to that tactic.
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Extolling her character, he raised the plane of the speech to the even
more lofty matters of spreading this Gospel .. to the great cities of the
world and over this globe. It would not have been done without her strength,
her courage, and her consecration to her Redeemer, the Lord Jesus Christ."
When It came to the salvation of the world, who could be worried about
Jimmy Swaggart's personal problems? His sin was minimized. Again, he had
transcended the current situation. However, In the eyes of the church,
Swaggart had committed a grievous sin; as evidence of his contrite heart,
he repented and. In a highly emotional manner, acknowledged his sin against
his wife and "begged" for her forgiveness.^"
Swaggart continued to address those whom he wronged by admitting his
guilt In having sinned against them. Those people Included his son, Donnle,
and daughter-in-law Debbie. During this portion of the speech, Donnle
cried, mouthed "I love you" and nodded In obvious agreement to forgive
his father. Debbie, while not crying, did hesitantly nod, perhaps In agree
ment—perhaps only In understanding. Like her mother-in-law, she too did
not look happy.
As Swaggart continued his confession, he began to tear, cry, and quiver,
a definite sign of averslve stimulation. This averslve stimulation allowed the
audience to see Swaggart's sincerity and suffering, with Swaggart as the
communication source (speaker) punishing Swaggart the sinner (target). The
crying and begging for forgiveness during the speech produced a profound
effect on his congregation. At times, members were clapping, crying, and
standing up In ovation. Swaggart continued—begging for forgiveness from
his church, the Bible college, (students and faculty), the Assemblies of God,
and the television audience. This begging for forgiveness and forbearance
was clearly a strategy of altruism, through which Swaggart sought to dem
onstrate his need for forgiveness and sympathy, while at the same time, using
his connection with God to help justify his audience's compliance.
To each group he addressed there was a pattern, the end of which ac
knowledged harm, emphasized the gravity of the sin and enabled him to
demonstrate a contrite heart. For example. In speaking "To the Assemblies
of God, which helped bring the Gospel to my little beleaguered town when
my family was lost without Jesus . ..," Swaggart said, "I have sinned against
you, and I have brought disgrace, and humiliation, and embarrassment upon
you. I beg your forgiveness." Only a person with a heart of stone, or the
mind of a cynic, would be unmoved.
Swaggart followed this pattern with each person or group he addressed.
The pattern of compliance-gaining apologia was: (1) Attention, (2) Attune-
ment, (3) Reinforcement, (4) Transcendence, (5) Positive Affirmation, (6) Neg
ative Affirmation, (7) Rapprochement, (8) Admission of Guilt, (9) Request for
Forgiveness. For example:
Dean Fadely and Loraye Hughes, "I Have Sinned Against You: A Criticism of Jimmy
Swaggart's Apology to the Assemblies of Cod Ministry." A paper presented at the
1991 Convention of The Speech Communication Association, Atalanta, Georgia. Oc
tober 31-November 3, 1991.
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(1) "This church, this ministry, this Bible College, these professors, this
choir
(2) that have stood with me on
(3) a thousand crusade platforms around the world, that
(4) have labored unstintingly and tirelessly to lift up the great name of
(5) Jesus Christ, to tell the weary He is rest, to
(6) tell the sin cursed that Jesus is victory
(7) You who have stood with me unflaggingly,
(8) 1 have sinned against you and. I have brought shame and embarrassment
to you.
(9) I beg your forgiveness."
These elements may be explained as follows: (1) Attention represented an
intonement identifying those to be addressed. (2) Attunement identified the
relationship the addressed had to the speaker. In each case, Swaggart recalled
a deep interpersonal bond, shared by the speaker and the group. This strat
egy called attention to a mutual deference system. (3) Reinforcement bol
stered the relationship, expressing either how great or how deep their re
lationship was. (4) Transcendence pointed to the common cause in which
they participated, a cause which was greater than any one of the individuals
involved. (5) Positive Affirmation was a belief statement which served to
bolster the speaker and audience's shared ideology—a statement of what
the group believed to be the ultimate Truth(s) and was placed prior to the
next element of the pattern in order to draw contrast. (6) The Negative
Affirmation names what has been regarded as evil, what was an appeal which
solidified the group by identifying what the group was against; whereas the
positive appeal identified what the group was for. (7) Rapprochement was
an enjoinment and reaffirmed the bond. It named the breadth of the personal
tie of the speaker and audience. It served as a reciprocal ratification. There
was an implicit admonition not to sever the tie. The speaker has depicted
himself as belonging to the group ideologically in the affirmations and socio-
emotively in the attunement and rapprochement. The group cannot judge
the speaker harshly or cast negative aspersions without also condemning
themselves. The speaker was so tightly identified with their common cause
that the group must see his failure or sin as a fluke, an oddity. The speaker
was "one of us" and what happened was an anomaly. Safe at this point, the
speaker can (8) admit guilt and (9) ask forgiveness.^^ (If, however, the speaker
continues to sin, the group will not view his transgressions as an anomaly,
but rather will view him as unworthy to be a member of the group—let
alone one of its leaders. Thus, as Swaggart was to discover, his rhetorical
pattern had its risks.)
As the speech continued, Swaggart intensified his request for forgiveness
by using the strategies of differentiation and transcendence in the context
of using Bible verses, and confessing to God and Jesus Christ. Swaggart's
confession to a higher power can be used as a justification for a forbearance
in judgment on the part of his audience. Swaggart tried to achieve this goal
by quoting bible verses and bolstering his audience's belief in God (tran-
Fadely and Hughes.
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scendence). The desired result of this tactic was to change his audience's
focus—moving their attention away from his sexual misconduct and toward
their common religious ground. Swaggart used this particular combination
of strategies throughout his address. Examples of his appeals to forgive his
sin based on religious reasons included: My sin "... is in the seas of God's
forgetfulness, never to be remembered against me anymore." "... through
His mercy, His grace, and His love, the sin, of which I speak, is not a present
sin. It is a past sin." "... sinners shall be converted ..."
With these strategies, Swaggart maneuvered his audience by establishing
common ground through mutual belief in the Lord, thereby enabling the
audience to answer in the affirmative the question: Should Jimmy Swaggart
be forgiven? To achieve this desired answer, Swaggart used the following
chain of reasoning:
—The Bible tells us that the Lord forgives upon confession.
—jimmy Swaggart has confessed to the Lord.
—Therefore, the Lord has forgiven Jimmy Swaggart.
—The Bible tells us that we are to follow our Cod.
—Our God has forgiven Jimmy Swaggart.
—Therefore, we should forgive Swaggart.
Thus, by asking their forgiveness for his sin, Swaggart gave his congregation
an opportunity, and a way, to demonstrate their faith—faith being a fun
damental and essential element in the Pentecostal movement, particularly
in the Assemblies of God denomination.
In addition to the aforementioned strategies, Swaggart also utilized the
techniques of bolstering, esteem, promise, and explanation during the speech.
Swaggart spoke about the ministry's successes around the world. He con
tinued to bolster the ministry by mentioning the success of the college, the
students, the faculty, the church, and their relationships with the Lord,
thereby implying causality on the part of jimmy Swaggart's ministry. Swaggart
eventually bolstered himself and built his personal esteem by calling himself
"... the vessel of the Lord." As Swaggart focused on the world-wide nature
of the ministry, his audience could only be proud to belong to this great
movement. Swaggart's terminology enabled his audience to transcend and
be transported by the images, taking attention away from the here and now.
When he referred to ".. .this movement in fellowship that circles the globe,"
the Gospel that combats the "darkness" of sin, the Gospel that saves "...
hundreds of millions" from Satan, "... the Gospel is a beacon of light," And
"... the seas of Gods forgetfulness," these phrases triggered elaborate fantasy
themes within the audience he addressed.
How could the elders have been upset with him when he complimented
them for upholding the standard of righteousness "... as missionaries on
the front lines of darkness, holding back the tides of hell"? Again, this was
a reaffirmation of the group's faith through the use of bolstering images, the
use of idioms with which the audience could identify, and then transcen
dence to a higher plane—a plane far above his sin. Swaggart even bolstered
himself and built his own positive esteem, by indicating his personal, if not
his prophetic, relationship with God saying: "God has said to me, 'I will do
33
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what I do before the whole world.' Blessed be the name of the Lord. [Em-
pahsis Ours.]
Swaggart continued throughout the speech to combine bolstering and
transcendence. By bolstering, he attempted to Identify himself with those
beliefs and values the audience viewed with esteem. By transcendence,
Swaggart joined sentiment with some larger context which was not presently
viewed as an attribute. Part of the reason he did this was to heighten paranoia.
Are church leaders "holding back the tides of hell"? Are the "unsaved"
trapped In "styglan" darkness? If he Is not forgiven, will this darkness and
hell take over the world? Will Satan win? Can the Pentecostal movement
continue without him?
Brant Short has argued that the paranoid style Is a form of transcendence.'^
Swaggart employed It In his apologia and throughout his sermons: Satan Is
powerful; he can tempt and destroy. Christian crusaders are needed to fight
the forces of evil. For Swaggart, the world Is a battle between Good and Evil,
God and Satan, the forces of Light and the forces of Darkness. Richard
Hofstadter described the politically paranoid person as one who "... finds
the world directed against a nation, a culture, a religious group, a way of
life whose fate affects not only himself but millions of others."" That Satan
Is ever present, ever evil, ever dangerous. Is clearly evidenced In Swaggart's
speech. This danger reaffirms group belief through fear appeals."'"
The explanatlve address, as a strategy of apologia, maintains that the speak
er will not be convicted If the audience truly understands the speaker's
actions. Swaggart sought to punish himself thereby relieving his congregation
of any obligation to convict or punish him. Swaggart made a promise to his
audience concerning the "punishment" for his actions: "I will step out of
the ministry for an Indeterminate amount of time, which will be determined
by the Lord." Again, Swaggart made the differentiation between the mem
bers of the Assemblies of God determining his punishment, versus the Lord
sentencing him. He continued transcending his audience away from his
personal sin and to the positive effects of Swaggart's leadership, his ministry
and Bible college, by asking "Will this ministry continue?" And replying,
"Yes, the ministry will continue .. . The Bible college will continue."
One clear cut stylistic device that Swaggart used to transcend his audience
Involved Identification through the use of personal pronouns. Throughout
the speech when referring to his sin, Swaggart spoke In the first person
singular "I." "I have sinned against you." After he asked the rhetorical ques
tion: "Will this ministry continue," Swaggart switched to the third person
plural "we." "We will continue." "We" was used to Identify Swaggart with
the more positive aspects of the ministry and Its many functions. Implied In
these statements was a persuasive plea which Swaggart made explicit In
subsequent broadcasts: "Keep up your sacrificial support In the name of the
Lord, for the work of the Lord." In other words: send money.
" Brant Short, "Comic Book Apologia: The 'Paranoid' Rhetoric of Congressman
George Hansen," Western Journal of Speech Communication 51 (1987): 189-203.
" Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1965) 415-16.
Fadely and Hughes.
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Swaggart asked and his listener's complied. Prior to his apologia, Swaggart
Ministries lost (1) television coverage when approximately 200 stations
dropped his weekly program, (2) suffered ratings decline of sixty-nine per
cent, and (3) had a decline in revenues from 3 milion dollars to one million
dollars a week. Prior to his speech, Swaggart was asked to resign from his
ministry. Following his speech, contributions and support resumed, the or
ganization continued operations, and Swaggart remained in charge and in
his pulpit. From that perspective, the speech was successful. However, in
October, 1991, Swaggart was found in the company of Rosemary Garcia,
another admitted streetwalker, and he was forced to seek "... professional
counseling and medical care.""
As Swaggart was to discover, continued transgressions would cause the
majority of his congregation to view his actions not as anomalous but the
norm. Their defections would cause Swaggart Minsitries the loss of national
television coverage and reduce them to broadcasting on fewer stations and
in locales such as Beaumont, Texas." Res ipsa loquitur. Res ascendent lumina
rebus. Res judicata. (Translation; The thing speaks for itself. One thing illu
minates the other. The matter has been decided.)
Conclusions
Swaggart's apology/confession revealed a definite intent to persuade his
audience. Elements of compliance-gaining and apologia were interrelated
and overlapped throughout Swaggart's speech. He effectively maneuvered
these strategies and avoided addressing any specifics related to his sinful
behavior. His speech also demonstrated the use of a sub-genre, specifically,
compliance-gaining apologia as opposed to isolated compliance-gaining tac
tics, a confessional apologia, or an apologia of regret. Swaggart's successful
use of compliance-gaining apologia strategies can establish a new perspective
for analyzing rhetorical discourse used by other public figures in the future.
" Nelson, Rob, "No Apologies This Time," Time (October 28, 1991): p. 35.
" Beaumont, Texas is one of the few places in the United States where the front
page of a newspaper, the Beaumont Enterprise, carries a daily prayer.
35
et al.: Volume 30, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1992/Winter 1993/Spring 1993/
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2021
BOOKER T. WASHINGTON'S SHORT-TERM
ELOQUENT STYLE ABETTING LONG-TERM




Booker T. Washington's Atlanta Exposition Address is prominent in the
canon of American public address. Delivered on 18 September 1895 (and
widely reprinted or anthologized thereafter), that speech "demonstrated
many of the qualities that characterized his oratorical effectiveness and that
won him recognition as a significant American speaker"; and to illustrate
how its "eloquent language possessed a moving and graphic quality, met
aphorically depicting truths that give dignity to labor, earth, and spirit,"
Danny Champion singles out a particular passage:
He showed adeptness by opening with a striking anecdote about a distressed
sailing vessel blown off course by a storm and running short of drinking water.
A passing vessel signaled for them to "lower your buckets where you are."
They were unaware they were sailing in the fresh waters where the Amazon
River flows into the Atlantic Ocean and had not yet become thoroughly
mixed with salt water. The application was for all groups in the audience to
take advantage of jobs, people, and opportunities there in the South. The
short figurative theme "cast down your bucket where you are" (repeated in
various forms eight times) provided unity to his message and gave Southerners
a quotable premise upon which to build future racial relations.^
Another paean to Washington's oratorical prowess restates the same pas
sage.^ Indeed, so significant is this specific metaphor that four different vol
umes of The Booker T. Washington Papers containing correspondence or other
materials about the Atlanta Exposition Address provide separate index entries
specifically for "Cast down your bucket where you are."^ This repeated
figuration embodying "down" may exemplify the "exception principle" ar
ticulated by Phillip Tompkins about rhetorical criticism as "the process of
explicating a specific attempt (whether successful or unsuccessful) to adjust
ideas to people and people to ideas," namely that "the critic should report
Ronald H. Carpenter is Professor of English, University of Florida, Gaines
ville FL 32611. An earlier version of this essay was read as a paper at the
Speech Communication Association Convention, Atlanta, 1991.
' Danny Champion, "Booker T. Washington Versus W.E.B. DuBois: A study in Rhe
torical Contrasts," in Oratory in the New South, ed. Waldo Braden (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1979): 187.
' Robert T. Oliver, History of Public Speaking in America (Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
1964): 354-55.
^ The Booker T. Washington Papers, ed. Louis R. Marian (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1972). See Volumes 1, 3, 4, and 5, hereafter cited as BTWP, followed by Roman
numeral volume and page.
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 30, Nos. 1-4 (1993), 32-38.
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only those things that are except/ona/—either qualitatively or quantitative
ly— in producing, or failing to produce, the desired effects."''
Some metaphors engage people's attention and memory as particularly
apt if not eloquent. Recall Franklin Roosevelt's "New Deal," Winston Chur
chill's "Iron Curtain," and John Kennedy's "New Frontier," for examples.
Despite any positive overtones resonating from the Biblical exhortation to
"cast down your nets," Washington's analog of "Cast down your bucket
where you are" was a figuration whose short term eloquence attained per
sonal acclaim for the orator but nevertheless likely abetted long term seg
regation for his race. In so doing, his was a metaphor gone awry; and that
critical assessment is predicated upon two criteria.
First, a metaphor reiterated eight times in an address derives "emphasis"
from the axiomatic "added strength given to the stimulus by repeating it
and in the consequent increase of our sensitivity to the stimulus," for "rep
etition of a stimulus, up to a certain point, may have greater effect than a
single stimulus, even if the latter is fairly strong."' From the perspective of
traditional theorists on style, repeating a specific word can have rhetorical
effect. Consider the following Aristotelian observation in The Rhetoric (1414a)
about the function and effect of stylistic repetition in parallel, like beginnings
{anaphora or epanaphora) as used in a passage quoted from Homer: "Nireus
from Syme brought three curved ships; Nireus, son of Aglaia and of Charopus;
Nireus, most beautiful of all the Greeks who came to Troy, saving Achilles
only." As Aristotle advised, "if a good many things are said about a person,
his name will have to be mentioned pretty often; accordingly, if his name is
often mentioned, one has the impression that a good deal has been said
about him. By the use of this fallacy. Homer, who mentions Nireus only in
this single passage, makes him important, and has preserved his memory,
though in the rest of the poem he says never a word more about him."' Or,
as the Greek critic Demetrius observes On Style, "Nireus is not himself
important in the Iliad, and his contribution is even less so, three ships an a
few men, but Homer makes him appear important and his contribution
great.. .. although Nireus is mentioned only once in the action, we remem
ber him.... If Homer had said: 'Nireus, the son of Aglaia brought three ships
from Syme,' he might as well not have mentioned him."' As more contem
porary research also attests, "the probability of recalling a repeated word is
just about twice the probability of recalling a unique word"; and that ad
vantage accrues not only for spoken discourse but the words we read, where
by "thresholds vary inversely with frequency of prior usage" which is im
mediate within the communication event (and not the relative frequency
' Phillip K. Tompkins, "The Rhetorical Criticism of Non-Oratorical Works," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, 55 (December 1969): 431-432.
' Jon Eisenson, j. Jeffrey Auer, and John V. Irwin, The Psychology of Communication
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963): 239; Giles Gray and Claude Wise, The
Bases of Speech, third ed., (New York: Harper and Row, 1959): 416.
' Aristotle Rhetoric ill. 12, in the translation by Lane Cooper (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1932).
' Demetrius On Style 61, in the translation by G. M. A. Grube (Toronto: Toronto
University Press, 1961).
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with which these verbal stimuli appear in word counts of more probable
lexical items generally).®
The second criterion applies to meaning thereby made emphatic, partic
ularly as evoked by repetition of the word "down." In Michael Osborn's
paradigm, some metaphors "place figurative value judgments upon subjects"
so "immune to changes wrought by time" that the "meaning comes to us
clearly across the barriers raised by time and cultural change."' For these
"archetypal metaphors are grounded in prominent features of experience,
in objects, actions, or conditions which are inescapably salient in human
consciousness" and thereby embody "basic human motivations." Admitted
ly, high and low often complement light and dark metaphors. For instance,
after Dunkirk in June 1940, Winston Churchill expressed hope for the future
and progress toward "sunlit uplands" in contradistinction to "the abyss of
a new Dark Age" in Nazi occupied Europe. Thus, what is conceptualized as
high is good; and low is bad, as in the psalmic "valley of the shadow of death."
Moreover, "vertical scale images, which project desirable objects above the
listener and undesirable objects below, often seem to express symbolically
man's quest for power." Applying this criterion to the metaphor repeated
exceptionally in the Atlanta Exposition Address, my assessment of "cast down
your bucket" also reflects the reminder that "our ordinary conceptual sys
tem, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical
in nature.... what we experience, and what we do every day is very much
a matter of metaphor."^® For as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson demonstrate
with extensive if not exhaustive examples, "orientational metaphors" about
up and down predominate in "our physical and cultural experience" with
myriad, metaphorical references to "up" linked inextricably to happiness,
consciousness, health, life, having power or control over others, quantity,
high status, virtue, or rationality. Conversely, figurations embodying "down"
invariably characterize utterances about sadness, unconsciousness, sickness,
death, being subject to control, insufficient quantity, low status, depravity,
or irrationality and negative emotional conditions." Actually, a "centrality"
of these up-down orientations as "cultural presuppositions" may originate
to some degree in physical experience: "We have bodies and we stand erect.
Almost every movement we make involves a motor program that either
changes our up-down orientation, maintains it, presupposes it, or takes it
into account in some way. Our constant physical activity in the world, even
' See for instance Nancy C. Waugh, "Immediate Memory as a Function of Repeti
tion," Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 2 (1963): 109; and Richard L.
Solomon and Leo Postman, "Frequency of Usage as a Determinant of Recognition
Threshold for Words," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 43 (1952); 198. Nevertheless,
the threshold of recognition also is more efficient according to "the relative frequency
with which that word occurs in the Thorndike-Lorge word counts." See also Davis
Howes and Richard L, Solomon, "Visual Duration Threshold as a Function of Word-
Probability," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41 (1951):410.
' Michael Osborn, "Archetypal Metaphor in Rhetoric: The Light-dark Family," Quar
terly Journal of Speech, 53 (1967): 115-126, see especially pp. 116, 120-21.
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980): 1.
" Lakoff and Johnson, 14-19.
38
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol30/iss1/1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL 35
when we sleep, makes an up-down orientation not merely relevant to our
physical activity but centrally relevant."" Thus, bearing in mind its archetypal,
negative imagery in combination with the implications of metaphor as a way
of thinking deeply rooted in physical experience, reconsider the repeated
"cast down your bucket" in the context of praise for Washington's ostensible
ability to adapt to racially distinct segments of his audience, black and white."
For blacks in his Atlanta audience, Washington delineated discursively how
they were to "cast down their buckets ... in agriculture, mechanics, in
commerce, in domestic service, and in the professions"; for he warned that
in the South, "we may overlook the fact that the masses of us are to live by
the production of our hands, and fail to keep in mind that we shall prosper
in proportion as well learn to dignify and glorify common labour and put
brains and skill into the common occupations of life." His metaphor thus
complemented a prevailing national mood which Andrew King calls "the
myth of heroic materialism"; for as America approached the turn of the
century and later, Washington's theme was "a variant of Russell Conwell's
familiar invitation to prosper in 'Acres of Diamonds.'... If you wish to be
great you must begin where you are and with what you are now... . Great
ness ... consists in doing great deeds with little means and the accomplish
ment of vast purposes from the private ranks of life."" As a result of Horatio
Alger stories reinforced through numerous biographies, countless dime nov
els, and what our historians proclaimed authoritatively, we believed that
success was within the grasp of people willing to struggle arduously against
adversity." With repetitions of "cast down your bucket where you are" as
"utterly commonplace affirmations of the American dream," Washington
rehearsed "the American script" and reinforced for blacks "truths of one
of the great communal visions" in this country." And for blacks then who
indeed were "down" in the American social hierarchy and lacked economic,
political, and educational mobility because of racism and segregation, striving
where you are seemed a realistic, reasonable view of their situation.
Washington's papers indicate he knew in advance the metaphor would
appeal to blacks. "Cast down your bucket" was not coined by Washington
for the Atlanta address; he had used it already several times after hearing
the metaphor originally in an 1893 Thanksgiving sermon by Hugh Mason
Browne at the Lincoln Memorial Church in Washington D.C. For examples,
in an April 1894 A.M.E. Church Review article, Washington used the lost ship
illustration with its "cast down your bucket" advice and attributed the ma
terial to "a recent speech in Washington" by "Professor Hugh Browne"; and
in an Emancipation Day address on 1 January 1895, in Montgomery, Alabama,
" Lakoff and Johnson, 56-57.
" See for instance Karl Wallace, "Booker T. Washington," in A History and Criticism
of American Public Address, Vol. I, ed. William N. Brigance (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1943): 407-33.
" Andrew King, "Booker T. Washington and the Myth of Heroic Materialism,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 60 (1974): 322-327.
" Ronald H. Carpenter, "America's Opinion Leader Historians on Behalf of Success,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 69 (1983): 111-126.
" King, 325-27.
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Washington used the same metaphor—with this favorable reaction from
blacks, reported in the Indianapolis Freeman, 26 January 1895:
This is the fifth or sixth time we have celebrated the greatest of all great
days to the Negro, and I can say without fear of contradiction that every year
doubles its interest. The address was delivered by that scholarly and deep
thinking gentleman. Prof. B.T. Washington of the Normal school at Tuskegee.
The address was as usually delivered by the speaker plain and instructive.
The speaker told how a vessel out at sea had thrown up its signal for help
from another vessel not far off, saying help, save us or we perish for water,
and the captain of the other vessel's reply was, cast down your buckets where
you are, and finally after several attempts to get help, and every time hearing
the same command, cast down your buckets where your are, decided to try,
and in so doing the buckets were drawn up with clear, cool, sparkling water
from the mouth of the Amazon. Right here the speaker impresses us to cast
down our buckets in the same manner, and they would come up as merchants,
manufacturers, scientists and men of all skillful advantages. The speaker tried
to impress his hearers to apply their time and money in giving their children
an industrial education through which medium we as a race will gradually
grow stronger and independent.^'
Thus, to many blacks, "cast down your bucket," delivered "plain and in
structive," helped evince the speaker's ethos as a "scholarly and deep think
ing gentleman." Washington was satisfied with the illustration and metaphor.
Although much of the Atlanta Exposition address was delivered from mem
ory, his autographed manuscript for the event contains several deletions and
emendations before delivery; but "cast down your bucket" material re
mained unchanged." In using a figuration whose favorable response from
blacks was ascertained earlier, Washington conformed to his predilection
for relying on what was tested out on others—either in speeches or in
securing prior reactions to texts he intended to utter."
For whites in his immediate Atlanta audience and nationally thereafter,
the repeated "cast down" metaphor—in discourse influencing race relations
for decades—could evoke meanings less favorable for blacks in a society
condoning lynching, disenfranchisement, and segregation in any and all its
insidious forms. Whites then "were almost single-mindedly committed to
the Darwinian struggle"; the age "was not charitable and did not call for a
synergistic relationship among social groups"; and thus as Robert Heath also
observes, "white people were placed under no obligations except whatever
'cast down your bucket' might mean."" As a potential labor force in a South
turning toward commerce and industrialization, blacks only were compe
tition for whites moving from their increasingly deficient agricultural econ
omy base to other ones improving their financial lot.^^ Casting "down" to
draw from that black labor force would be unappealing, in both the South
" 6TWP, III, 410, 413, and 496; V, 50.
" fiTWP, III, 578-585.
" Wallace, 417-18.
" Robert Heath, "A Time for Silence: Booker T. Washington in Atlanta," Quarterly
journal of Speech, 64 (1978): 385-99.
Ronald H. Carpenter, "On American History Textbooks and Integration in the
South: Woodrow Wilson and the Rhetoric of Division and Reunion 1829-1889," Southern
Speech Communication Journal, 51 (1985): 1-23.
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and North. After all, slavery earlier had been anathema in the North not only
as a moral evil but also for any economic implications that might accrue from
factory owners acquiring slaves to work rather than employing whites. More
insidiously pervasive than those economic implications, however, was the
prevalent racism viewing blacks as unworthy. Thus, what Washington's re
peated metaphor likely "might mean" for those whites could reinforce afore
mentioned archetypal "figurative value judgments ... immune to changes
wrought by time ... grounded in prominent features of experience, in
objects, actions, or conditions which are inescapably salient in human con
sciousness." Because "vertical scale images ... project desirable objects above
the listener and undesirable objects below," repetition of "cast down" likely
reinforced at some level of awareness, however subtle, "basic human mo
tivations" among whites that blacks were lower and thereby deserving of
segregation.
In this context, consider another of Washington's figurations for his Atlanta
Address, one whose stylistic form as an antithesis conduced to memorability
for its content as a simile: "In all things that are purely social we can be as
separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual
progress." As Edward W. Blyden attested on 24 September 1895, this "so
apt and expressive" line was one of "several sentences in your address that
ought to be printed in bold letters and set up as mottos in various parts of
your Institute; for its seems to me that they are really the maxims which
have guided your life work."" But why not assume people "down" or lower
on a vertical scale should be separate and hence segregated? After all, this
"frequently quoted passage, known as the persuasive hand analogy" be
stowed upon Washington "the mantle of 'leader of the Negro people' ...
not because he had just initiated a new proposal, but because he had phrased
it so well for a national audience"; for as Champion also proclaims, "the
'separate but equal' idea, implied in the Atlanta speech, became the yardstick
of American race relations for the next half century.""
As we now know, "separate but equal" was grossly unequal, and perhaps
no metaphor—with whatever repetition—could have bridged the gap be
tween races then. But segregation likely was served by a figuration repeating
and thereby reinforcing archetypal meaning suggesting that blacks were
lower than whites on a hierarchical scale. For as an anthropological per
spective maintains, long term "social functions" of metaphors reflect how
well they aptly epitomize a society's "truth of things" and a "prescription
for action" answering the question "what shall we do about this?"" More
over, such metaphor "does not just express the pertinence of certain cultural
axioms to given social conditions, it provides the semantic conditions through
which actors deal with that reality" thereby providing a "futureness to the
past and a pastness to the future."
" fiTWP, IV, 27.
" Champion, 188-89.
" ]. Christopher Crocker, "The Social Function of Rhetorical Forms" and J. Fernan
dez, "The Performance of Ritual Metaphors," both in The Social Use of Metaphor:
Essays on the Anthropology of Rhetoric, J. David Sapir and ]. Christopher Crocker, eds.,
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977): 33-66 and 100-131.
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To conclude, by advocating eloquently the values of hard work, education,
and striving for success by blacks where they were (even if "down"), Wash
ington placed his race in the mainstream of progress toward fulfilling the
prevailing American dream. But he should have sensed an inappropriateness
of his "cast down" metaphor for whites; for at some level of awareness, he
appreciated the hierarchical imagery of verticality. After all, Washington's
autobiography was not entitled "out of slavery" but "up from slavery." For
the Atlanta Exposition Address, an orator more truly that "rhetorically sensitive
person ... willing to undergo the strain of adaptation" well might have been
more astute stylistically in phrasing the line repeated so often." Eschewing
any impulse simply to be content resonating Biblical phraseology, Washing
ton could have omitted the word "down" and said, for instance, "cast your
buckets and draw the water where you are" or "cast your buckets and drink
the water where you are." For when coupled with the oft quoted "separate
as the fingers" simile, repetition instead of "cast down your bucket" only
might reinforce archetypal "basic human motivations," then among many
whites, that blacks were below them and thereby deserving of segregation
imposed by people "up" or "higher" in power. Admittedly, such a rhetorical
effect indeed would be subtle, but that metaphor repeated for whites only
would make more emphatic an already perceived, widely accepted, and
totally tragic disparity between the races. In thereby emphasizing through
repetition that unfortunate social hierarchy, Washington's was a metaphor
gone awry.
" After Roderick Hart and Don Burks, "Rhetorical Sensitivity and Social Interaction,"
Speech Monographs, 39 (June 1972): 75-91.
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SYMPOSIUM ON POLICY DEBATE
ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE:
LEARNING TO THINK CRITICALLY
Sally K. Murphy and Jack A. Samosky
California State University Hayward
Based of the critiques of current pedagogicai/androgogica! practices and
suggestions for improving the ways in which we teach critical thinking skills,
we take another look at the traditional Argumentation and Debate class.
Despite the plethora of "new ideas" about how to best learn critical thinking,
we conclude that the traditional course provides a learning environment in
which all the skills of critical thinking are taught; supplies a forum in which
those skills can be integrated and refined; and is unique among the disciplines
in developing students' skills in communicating their ideas to others.
Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the worse in a
free and open encounter?
—Milton
Recently we were asked to make a presentation to a national conference
on Critical Thinking. The majority of presenters and attendees were from
English and Philosophy. Few attendees and fewer presenters were from
Speech Communication.^ We were surprised since we envision our discipline
as centrally concerned with teaching critical thinking. Our curiosity aroused,
we looked for other indications of others' perceptions of Speech Com
munication's contributions to the teaching of critical thinking. The State of
California requires that all undergraduates complete at least one approved
course which teaches critical thinking. We counted the courses in com
munication which fulfill the critical thinking requirement in the California
State University system. No course in Speech Communication fulfills the
requirement on five of the twenty California State University campuses; and
only one communication course meets the requirement on another five
(Report of the Department Chairs, 1992). This is not the picture we expected.
Have we not been teaching critical thinking skills for a couple of thousand
years? Perhaps we have taken-for-granted an identity which others do not
recognize.
Our purpose in this essay is to reframe the arguments for the argumen
tation and debate course as a primary means of teaching critical thinking.
First we will look at the components of critical thinking. Next, we examine
the notion of a "cognitive apprenticeship" (Resnick and Klopfer, 1989, p.
9), a learning environment fundamental to the integrated learning of critical
An earlier version of this paper was presented to the 1991 Critical Thinking
Conferene, Sonoma State University, Rohnert Park, CA.
' The notable exception at the 1991 Sonoma Conference was Dr. Kathleen Hall
Jamison.
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thinking. Finally, we offer our arguments for the special role of argumen
tation and debate courses in developing the essential skills of citizenship.
The essence of our argument is that the argumentation and debate course
teaches all the skills of critical thinking and supplies a forum in which those
skills can be integrated and honed, where students learn to translate indi
vidual skills into messages to reach others.
Critical Thinking
A society such as ours rests on the shoulders of its citizens. If we think
those shoulders are sagging under the burden of information too difficult
and too complex for many to sort, it is not a lack of native ability that is at
fault. It is our failure, generally as a culture and specifically as teachers, to
invest the time, energy, and pedagogical creativity needed to foster the
development of critical thinking skills in our students. In this section we will
look at the skills which leaders of the critical thinking movement say con
stitute critical thinking. Then we will look at the question of teaching; what
pedagogical methods are best to develop critical thinkers?
The Skills of Critical Thinking
In discussing the importance of critical thinking to maintaining a free
society, R. W. PauP (1989) makes explicit critical thinking's multiple skills
which include knowledge of "how to isolate and distinguish issues, premises,
assumptions, conclusions, and inferences, and ... argument assessment" (p.
4). Beyond the basic skills lies the more difficult task of learning emancipatory
reasoning, a set skills which are "ultimately intrinsic to the character of the
person and to insight into one's own cognitive and affective processes" (p.
3). Paul describes two components of emancipatory reasoning. The first is
the recognition of human tendencies to seek uncritically support for prior
assumptions and desires, and to seek justificatory reasons for attaining per
sonal advantage. The second component of emancipatory reasoning is the
application of critical thought to the messy problems of the real world.
Of course Paul is right. Critical thinkers are those who are able to construct
and analyze arguments, recognize their own sources of bias, appreciate the
power of emotion and values in shaping our judgments of "good reason",
and apply those skills to real-world messy problems. How can we foster such
development?
The Pedagogical Challenge
The ease with which we can list the skills of critical thinking masks the
difficulty of learning to be critical thinkers. Just as knowledge of the tech
niques for any task does not insure the ability to perform the task, teaching
our students what the components of critical thinking are does not recreate
^ Richard Paul is Director of the Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique,
Sonoma State University, Rohnert Park, California.
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them as critical thinkers. Resnick' and Klopfer" argue that in order to assist
our students' progress toward becoming critical thinkers we must; (a) Provide
learning contexts which require reasoning and problem-solving; (b) develop
students' motivation to put to use the skills of critical thinking; and (c) create
in our students the habit of critical thinking. They argue further that this
best happens when pedagogical practices require social interaction, for in
such interaction critical thinking may be modeled and honed, and in such
settings students learn that the habits of critical thought are socially ap
proved. Resnick and Klopfer (1989) call the learning environments in which
such learning is nurtured a "cognitive apprenticeship" (p. 9). Cognitive ap
prenticeships, like trade apprenticeships, have three characteristics: a real
task, contextualized practice, and opportunity to observe others doing the
tasks (p. 10).
This brief review of the perspectives on critical thinking from those outside
the communication discipline suggests the following components are basic
to teaching and developing critical thinking skills: (a) basic skills of argument
construction and analysis; (b) self-reflection and a commitment to idea test
ing; and (c)an environment in which real problems, practice, and observation
come together to foster learning. In the section below, the argumentation
and debate class is examined for its capacity to supply those three compo
nents.
Argumentation and Debate
Argumentation and debate courses offer students training in the multiple
stages of critical thinking. The study of argumentation teaches students an
alytical skills: the varied requirements of proof for propositions of fact, value,
and policy; kinds of evidence and warrants required for ethical support for
each claim; the pitfalls of fallacious reasoning; and the diverse forms of
reasoning found in political, social, and interpersonal contexts. Debate then
places those skills into an interactive context which requires students to use
their reasoning skills in advocacy. The two, argumentation and debate, sup
port each other.
What should be made clear is the way in which argumentation and debate
courses differ from many courses in logic or quantitative reasoning. We
would expect any course in critical thinking to teach the basic reasoning
tools; they are "skills which can be tacked on to other learning" (Paul, p. 3).
But not all courses in reasoning will supply the same contexts for application
of those tools. A course in physics, for example, should prepare the student
to understand, analyze, and use those skills as they are applied to the specific
reasoning appropriate in science. The tools which a course in argumentation
provides are the tools of rhetorical rather than formal, scientific, or math
ematical logic. The focus is on reasoning which is encountered in everyday
discourse. Students are taught to look for that which is assumed in the
' Lauren Resnick is Professor of Psychology and Director of the Learning Research
and Development Center, University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Leopold Klopfer is Professor of Education and Senior Scientist at the Learning
Research and Development Center, University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
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arguments of advertisers, editorialists, politicians, friends, lovers, and phys
icists and to assess critically those assumptions. They are alerted to the ways
in which practical arguers make inferences and learn to evaluate the quality
of those inferences. They learn to examine the kinds and quality of evidence
offered in efforts to influence decision-making. Our role as teachers of
argumentation and debate, then, is to provide the basic skills of critical
reasoning in the context of everyday experience. These are the tools which
prepare individuals to participate as active citizens and ethical advocates.
Jensen puts the lessons of argumentation and debate training well: "Indeed,
[argumentation and debate] teaches us that most issues have more than two
sides. One learns to disagree without being disagreeable, to challenge ideas
and not the person" (1981, p. 8).
Courses in argumentation and debate provide students with the basic skills
of critical thinking. Yet possession of these skills only prepares students to
become active and critical thinkers. Paul (1989) is right that the basic skills
are not enough. For students to be critical thinkers, they must develop the
emancipatory reasoning skills so "essential to the free, rational, and auton
omous mind" (p. 3). Debate, as a structured activity is ideally suited to the
development of thinking persons.
Emancipatory Reasoning
Debate is an oral activity which results from serious research, careful anal
ysis, and considered construction of arguments. Debating takes students
beyond argument construction requiring them to present their arguments
to others for analysis and refutation. Like an argumentative essay, debate
requires the presentation and reasoned defense of a claim. Unlike an essay,
debate requires that the arguments which support the claim, and the claim
itself, be subjected to analysis and refutation by others. Moreover, debaters
work together to examine critically a proposition appealing to the judgment
of an audience for a decision about the effectiveness of their advocacy. It is
participation in that process that assists students in integrating the skills which
they learn in the study of argument.
The immediacy and complex demands of debate are summarized by Daniel
Rohrer (1987): "The process of debate, therefore, becomes as important as
the issues contained within it. Debate must be more than an argument
spoken rather than written, or a case on its feet; it must be an experience
in intellectual confrontation with an immediate clash that nonverbal activities
cannot duplicate easily. The debater should seek to persuade, but primarily
through the use of logic, for the true skills of argumentation are those of
reasoning" (p. 9). It is by this process that we believe that emancipatory
reasoning can be promoted.'
Students entering a debate have already thoroughly researched the prop
osition in dispute. The position which a student accepts, prior to the re-
' We are speaking here about classroom debating rather than competitive debate.
It is not our purpose to engage the disputes about the effects of speed of presentation,
generic disadvantages, and "bodies on the flow" on critical thinking. We support
competitive debate and we recognize its warts.
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search, is irrelevant to the activity. Whether students prepare to argue either
for or against the proposition, or prepare on both sides, they are in a context
where their friends and colleagues are arguing a range of positions on a
particular proposition. Students trained in argumentation and debate learn
that there is seldom a single position on any proposition which is true and
right. They learn that there are good reasons available for many positions
and beliefs on any topic. They learn to see the legitimacy of opposing ideas
and so learn to respect both the ideas and persons with whom they disagree.
Debate encourages students to test actively their ideas and the ideas of others
before, while, and after they develop reasoned commitments.
in the argumentation classroom, debaters speak to an audience, usually
their classmates, who assess the relative persuasiveness of the arguments
presented. The debaters are opponents only in form. They appeal to an
audience to judge the arguments on their ability to withstand critique. This
promotes two equally important goals. First, debaters offer ideas to be eval
uated. They know, as does their audience, that their personal beliefs may
or may not be reflected in their presentations; their job is to provide the
best defense possible for the position they take in the debate. Second, the
audience is the ultimate judge of the quality of the reasoning offered. So
the audience is involved in critical thinking as well as the debaters. All learn
how to listen carefully for what is said and what is left unsaid; for what is
attacked and defended; and, what is left to stand without comment. It is in
the immediacy of the exchange, the clarity of the clash of opposing positions,
the directness of refutation and rebuttal that students draw upon all of the
skills which they initially learned in studying argument. These demands are
most immediate for the debaters but are placed upon the audience as well.
Debate, then, provides the unique opportunity for students to "apply the
principles of critical thinking not only to problems that emerge in the relative
leisure of research ... but also to problems that arise in the stress of debate"
(Freeley, 1986, p. 22).
One of Paul's strongest criticisms of the ways in which critical thinking is
taught is the use of abstract or purified problems to be analyzed using the
basic skills of reasoning. If for no higher reason than the need of the instructor
to be able to maintain interest in a number of debates over a term of work,
students in argumentation and debate classes are usually asked to consider
real world problems which have no clear or "right" answers. They are en
couraged to examine the human as well as the theoretical and technical
issues involved in such problems. Arguments include the most technical and
the most value-laden. In the classroom, students may debate propositions
which are relevant to their campuses; they may debate personal choices;
they often debate current topics of local or national interest. These questions
are as real and as messy as issues can be. One cannot spend a term researching
various positions and their justifications without coming to see the value
commitments which underlie each suggested solution, without coming to
recognize the intricate ways in which each proffered solution implicates
other policies and other values, and without having to face one's own per
sonal and political commitments.
We believe that those who study argumentation and debate are far better
able to understand and participate in public decision-making. Paul (1989)
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argues that emancipatory reasoning calls for "dialogical reasoning, for think
ing critically and reciprocally within opposing points of view" (pp. 9-10). In
classroom debate one can create an arena in which dialogical exchanges may
occur.
A Cognitive Apprenticeship
We believe that the contribution that debate makes to learning critical
thinking is that it has all three of the characteristics of a cognitive appren
ticeship: real tasks, contextualized practice, and opportunity to watch others
doing the same tasks.
Debaters argue propositions which are real. The task of the debaters is to
advocate particular policies and values which address important contem
porary problems. Resnick and Klopfer (1989) suggest that for the task to be
real the advocacy should be addressed to someone other than the teacher
who assigns a grade. Debate provides that other audience. Students debate
in front of their classmates as well as their teacher with the goal of persuading
the whole. When conditions permit students debate for interested members
of the campus community or the community at large. Now their goal is to
persuade by elucidating a complex issue for the benefit of the community.
The second characteristic of a cognitive apprenticeship is "contextualized
practice of tasks, not exercises on component skills that have been lifted
out of the contexts in which they are to be used" (Resnick and Klopfer, p.
10). Here they offer the example of debate as one such contextualized
activity. For debate requires that the learners bring to bear all the basic
reasoning skills in analyzing the arguments as they are presented.
The third characteristic of a cognitive apprenticeship is the opportunity
to see the task modeled by others. Such modeling provides standards for
effective and ineffective performance. Modeling helps to make the mental
activities required in the performance of the task overt. Modeling encour
ages building upon each other's experiences. The learning of critical thinking
takes place in a social not just solitary context. Since all students in an
argumentation and debate class participate as both audience and as debaters,
they have frequent opportunities to see how the task can be managed. They
observe, as audience, the successful and unsuccessful strategies; they practice
their skills in context; and, they provide feedback to others who are debating
and they receive feedback on their own performance as debaters. The feed
back is not limited to the teacher's grade but is provided by the larger
audience.
Thus far, we have argued that courses in argumentation and debate teach
the basic skills of critical thought; that debate provides a forum in which the
skills of emancipatory reasoning are developed; and that debating is a ped
agogical strategy which creates the cognitive apprenticeship called for by
Resnick and Klopfer. Framing the arguments for argumentation and debate
in the language of critical thinking scholars may win us a larger audience
than we are currently seeing. Yet, we would be remiss if we did not offer
an additional line of reasoning which is too often missing from critical think
ing descriptions: debate is a communication activity.
What we often find missing from discussions of the teaching and learning
of critical thinking is a recognition of the importance of communication skills
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which we believe are fundamental to the thinking person. The ability to
communicate one's thoughts, no matter how well reasoned, is not an au
tomatic outcome of possessing the skills of critical thinking. Indeed, while
speaking well requires thinking well, the reverse seems not to hold true. In
learning to debate, students learn the skills required for communicating
ideas to others. The structure of a debate encourages development of com
munication skills. Time is limited for each speaker. What needs to be said
must be said with clarity and force within the time constraints. What needs
to be argued is presented with the knowledge that one's opponent and
one's audience are actively and critically listening. The claims, warrants, and
evidence must be concise and persuasive. In the classroom, at least, the
presentations must be audience-centered and the debaters must be able to
translate the technical into the accessible and the complex into the under
standable. They must be able to move outside the realm of all they know to
that which their audience needs to know.
Courses in argumentation and debate do not produce articulate, critical
thinkers all on their own. No course can hope to do so. But argumentation
and debate courses teach the basic skills of critical thinking and create a
cognitive apprenticeship which cultivates emancipatory reasoning by pro
viding real tasks which motivate critical thinking, and encourage the de
velopment of the habit of critical thought. They assist students in developing
the communication skills necessary for active participation in the community
of decision-makers. As Patterson and Zarefsky (1983) put it: "As arguers, we
must know the methods of gathering information as well as its analysis. We
must observe, classify, hypothesize, analyze, experiment, sample, and gen
eralize. We must then apply these methods to all of the available evidence
that our research and investigation can produce and examine the motives
and values held by ourselves and society that are involved in reaching a
decision on the basis of such evidence" (pp. 313-314). We would simply add
that as arguers we must also be able to communicate our ideas to others so
that they too can judge their efficacy. A course in argumentation and debate
provides the opportunities to develop all of those skills.
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THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF






For most of this century, debaters in both academic and competitive circles
have crafted the rules of argumentation and deliberation based on rational
models of communication. As children of the Enlightenment, debaters have
made the assumption that humans are rational creatures, capable of dis
cernment, sensitivity, and judgment.^ Debates have been organized around
the belief that when members of the public or their surrogate policy makers
have at their disposal a wealth of research and credible evidence, that they
can forge pragmatic policies to cope with significant social problems. We
have at times disagreed about the specific form of this rationality or the
specific criteria to be employed, but have rarely questioned either the ped
agogical or heuristic value of finding the essential principles that guide our
practical reasoning. Whether our individual proclivities have attracted us to
the works of Plato, Aristotle, or the Sophists, we have shared a belief that
by shifting through the evidence supplied in argumentation we can improve
ourselves, the academy, and the community in which we reside.
In recent years, these tacit assumptions of modernity and its rationalistic
models have been interrogated by a plethora of postmodern and post-
structural approaches. Commentators in the past several decades have as
saulted our modern epistemological "cathedrals" of learning, and have been
increasingly unwilling to engage in the quest for universal, foundational
principles that govern the construction of social relationships.^ Many West
ern critics began to question some of the essentialist goals of rational think
ing, often complaining that the rules of reasoning and rational deliberation
that were traditionally circulated within the academy were based on canons
of logic crafted by elites (usually rich, white, and dead) who had little un
derstanding of the needs of postmodernity. With the rising power of women
and people of color in the public domain, the older standards of evaluation
and hierarchy no longer seemed adequate. Since the end of the 1960s, the
halls of many universities have been filled with the voices of teachers and
students commenting on the late works of "postmodern" liberal writers. As
' See for example Jurgen Habermas's continued defense of the Enlightenment pro
ject and his criticism of some postmodern theories of knowledge. Jurgen Habermas,
"Modernity versus Postmodernity," New German Critique 22 (1981).
' We borrow the notion of the "cathedral" of knowledge from John Nerone's
insightful essay, "Theory and History," Communication Theory 3 (1993): 148-57.
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Daniel Conway has recently observed, we seem to be working within "an
academic climate dominated by deconstruction, genealogy, Lacanian anal
ysis, Foucaultian archaeology, and other subversive strategies for exposing
claims to authority."' By the early 1990s, some of these ideas had surfaced
in the policy debate community, and now advocates found in their hands a
new weapon to add to their arsenal—"the critique" (kritik)."
The critique has come of age in modern intercollegiate debate, and de
serves further examination. In this essay we are concerned with both the
oretical and practical issues that need to be addressed by debaters interested
in the "critique." Both the promise and the peril of the critique come from
its use as a method of questioning some of the assumptions behind "policy"
debate itself. We believe that in order to engage in a critique debate, debaters
have to be willing to question some of the taken-for-granted and basic
assumptions behind traditional debate. Yet at the same time, we believe that
there are theoretical and practical limits that are placed on these critiques
by the nature and function of competitive debate.
Our intent is not to suggest that we rigidly lock debate into a process that
defends traditional policy perspectives. We applaud approaches that attempt
to perpetuate the debate community's interest in intellectualism, novelty,
and adaptability. However, as we argue below, some forms of totalizing
critiques devolve into nihilistic exercise which have little to do with inval
idating the assumptions behind policy debate.'
There are some interesting parallels between the work of the Critical Legal
Studies movement (CLS or Grits) in judicial argumentation and the move
towards the "critique" in competitive debate. Just as debaters employ de-
constructive, rhetorical, and other language tools to systematically question
some of the assumptions behind policy debate, the early members of CLS
wanted to interrogate the taken-for-granted within the empire of the "Rule
of Law."' The weapons deployed by the CLS in their critiques included
painting verbal pictures of Utopian visions (Unger), crafting revisionist his
tories (Gordon), employing Burkean analysis (Frug) and pointing out some
' Daniel W. Conway, "Nietzsche and Autonomy in Communication Ethics," Com
munications 12 (1991): 217-230, 217.
* The arguments in support of this position are found in William Shanahan, "kritik
of thinking," in Health Care Policy: Debating Coverage Cures, ed. Roger E. Solt and
Ross K. Smith (Winston-Salem: Wake Eorest University, 1993), A-3. Eor another in
terpretation of the importance of "the critique," see the debate between Darren
Summerville and Joe Bellon, "Deconstructing Debate: To Critique or not to Critique?"
Policy Caucus Newsletter 4 (1992): 3-6.
' While this essay is provides a theoretical rationale for the rejection of the critique,
more pragmatic arguments for rejection can be found in Edward Panetta and Dale
Herbeck, "Argument in a Technical Sphere: Incommensurate Rhetorical Visions," in
Argument and the Postmodern Challenge: Proceedings of the Eighth SCA/AFA Conference
on Argumentation, ed. by Raymie McKerrow (Annandale VA.: Speech Communication
Association, forthcoming).
' This included a critique of realistic methodologies, including legal "doctrine,"
formalistic reasoning, and progressive legal reform. See "Round and Round the Bram
ble Bush: Erom Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship," Harvard Law Review 95
(1982): 1669-90, 1671; Duncan Kennedy, "The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Eoucaultl"
Legal Studies Forum 15 (1991): 327-65.
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of the contradictions that existed in formal legal systems (Kennedy)/ Some
members of the CLS were even willing to "trash" the entire modern legal
structure.®
The early Critical Legal studies essays were as innovative as the first critique
arguments presented within the debate community. They were filled with
arguments about the incoherence, the indeterminacy, and the politics of
any social order. Just a debaters would later begin to question the "whys"
of policy debating, the first Grits attacked the notion that we needed any
formulaic system of laws to govern the way in which social actors engaged
in deliberative discourse. These first critiques we call "totalizing" critiques
because they adopt the perspectives that only by engaging in the complete
deconstruction of the older system can we truly question existing frame
works of "rights" or "duties." These pathbreaking critiques in the legal
academia brought into question the use of traditional legal paradigms, or
thodox rules of evidence, and the very existence of "rational expertise."'
Many of these totalizers believed regretfully that "trashing" was both nec
essary and "simply the best available academic posture."^® This theoretical
annihilation of the modern legal rules was justified on the basis that we
needed to demystify the law.
Yet in later years, the theories espoused by members of the CLS were
assailed not only by defenders of the traditional legal system, but by sym
pathetic members of the left who felt that the total annihilation of the judicial
system meant a denigration of the incremental improvements that had been
made in the area of civil rights or unionism." Modified forms of legal critiques
were created, that began to look at the ways that radicals could combine
the constructive aspects of language without trashing the existing legal
frameworks. We call these approaches "partial" critiques in that they attempt
to appropriate the language of empowered communities rather than com
pletely removing vocabularies.
It is our contention that the best approach that can be taken in order to
fulfill the promise of the critique is to encourage debaters to engage in
"partial" rather than "totalizing" critiques. We take this stance not because
we are interested in ossifying the rules of policy debate, but because we
feel that the best way to engage in critical inquiry is to avoid protracted
theory debates that are disengaged from concrete social, political, or eco
nomic policy. Far too often in the early critique debates, we see this stance
' See, for example, Roberto Mangabeira Linger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); Robert W. Cordon, "Critical Legal His
tories," Stanford Law Review 36 (1984): 57-125; Jerry Frug, "Argument as Character,"
Stanford Law Review 40 (1988): 869-927; Duncan Kennedy, "The Structure of Black-
stone's Commentaries," Buffalo Law Review 29 (1979): 211-382.
® Mark G. Kelman, "Trashing," Stanford Law Review 36 (1984): 293-98.
' Kelman, "Trashing," 296.
Kelman, "Trashing," 297.
" This led to the development of feminist critiques, critical race theories, and other
perspectives that appropriated some of the language and methodologies of the CLS.
For an example of what we consider to be a "partial" critique, see Martha Minow,
Making All The Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Ithaca: Cornell Uni
versity Press, 1990).
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employed as a substitute for critical engagement. Instead of having rounds
that systematically question some of the basic assumptions of policy debate,
we sometimes have debates that stop and end at the stage of questioning
the fundamentals of policy debate itself. The language deployed in defense
of the critique in these kinds of debates have at times served to defeat some
theoretical goals of the critique—in place of emancipation, we have dom
ination. These "totalizing" critiques use the inherent ambiguity of decon-
structive approaches as a means of evasion of the substantive issue rather
than a novel way to question the assumptions behind particular political
stances. By watching some of the experiences of the members of the Critical
Studies movement in their attempts to delegitimize the judicial quest for
foundational knowledge, we can see some of the arguments that could be
used in critique debates without gutting policy debate.
The remainder of our commentary will be divided into three parts. First,
we discuss some of the possibilities revealed by "the critique," second, we
present some of the hazards for the debate community if it takes the de-
constructive turn, finally, we briefly discuss the implications of "the critique"
for practical policy deliberation.
The Promise of Deconstruction
In academic circles, the rise of deconstructive approaches to history, lit
erature, philosophy, and rhetoric has provided teachers and intellectuals
with new ways to think about the creation of social relationships. Instead of
perpetuating existing social inequities and hierarchial relationships, defend
ers of deconstruction techniques attempt to empower ordinary human ac
tors by demystifying the knowledge structures that grant authority to priv
ileged elites both within and outside of educational institutions. Intellectual
champions of deconstruction perspectives usually claim three advantages of
the "the critique": (1) it is supposedly non-essentialist; (2) dialogical in nature;
and (3) more inclusive than traditional scholastic approaches.
For many academicians, many of the benefits of the "new" deconstructive
perspectives come from their ability to undermine some of the essentialist
assumptions built into traditional theories of argument and communication.
From at least the end of the eighteenth century. Western theorists have
vociferously defended a classical liberal model of education based on the
claim that the "progress" of civilization depended on a growth of infor
mation, clear thinking, and an exchange of some of the foundational ideas
that guide civic action. Many of these essentialist forms of argument assume
that knowledge of human "nature" or behavior exists independent of culture
and social relationships, and that given enough time and effort knowledge
able people can "discover" the universalizing principles that guide civili
zation. From within modern variations of this ancient theme, social reforms
and progressive change come gradually as members of the polity are eman
cipated and allowed to share in the fruits of intellectual and industrial labor.
Within the deconstruction literature, many of the orthodox methods of
obtaining knowledge—from social scientific investigation to the search for
artistic canons—are believed to be problematic in that they serve to inhibit
rather than facilitate radical change. The "texts," rules of evidence, and the
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standards for judgment in classical liberal thinking are treated by postmod
ernists as human constructs that hide racism, sexism, and other pernicious
ideological structures. Writings that might seem to be seminal or authori
tative in traditional circles become examples of hidden oppression and il
legitimate power in postmodern works. The goal of deconstructionists is
therefore to illuminate the power struggles, motivations, or other tensions
that exist at the time of the construction of "essential" material. For many
postmodernists, those intellectuals who are truly interested in helping lib
erate an individual, community, or "the people" need to work on decon
structing the discourse that is used to dominate human beings.
Another advantage often alluded to by deconstruction advocates is that
it provides critics with a dialogic rather than a closed approach to learning
and understanding. The classical liberal model of communication is often
speaker oriented, where learned rhetors are imbued with wisdom that needs
to be dispensed to a spectator public. From a deconstruction perspective,
modern legislative and judicial forums are based on univocal models of com
munication, where dispassionate judges or advocates are said to "settle" a
particular controversy or policy by appealing to universal rules, standards,
or principles." Within modern paradigms, disputes between contending
parties can be resolved through reasonable debate and argumentation, and
representative parties negotiate the feasibility of particular policy alterna
tives. From the perspective of postmodern critics, no texts are dispassionately
constructed, and no issues are ever really "settled." For deconstructionists,
it is audiences as well as speakers who are constantly creating texts, and
therefore there are an almost limitless number of readings or interpretations
of any discursive construct. Unequivocally, thus becomes a myth that needs
to be replaced with dialogic communication.
Finally, the third advantage that is usually raised in defending the decon-
structive perspective is its inclusiveness. The goal of removing essentialized
texts is believed to be the first step in providing the marginalized around
the world with the opportunity to speak. Deconstructionists within the acad
emy contend that if societies want to eradicate racism, sexism, colonialism,
and other oppressive power relationships, then they must shed some of the
language that keeps them imprisoned in destructive ways of thinking. By
attacking the privileging of any textual interpretations, postmodernists pro
pose to clear the ground for alternative readings of texts provided by women,
people of color, the poor, and the disenfranchised. Many deconstructionists
claim that by moving away from the quest for absolute or foundational
principles of "truth," "justice," or "rule of law," we can begin to expand
our horizons and deal with a fragmented postmodern world. Intellectuals
" For those interested in reviewing the literature that is available on the relationship
between deconstruction and legal practices, see the work of some of the members
of the Critical Legal Studies Movement. The best bibliography of literature relating
to law and communication can be found in Duncan Kennedy and Karl E. Klare, "A
Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies," Yale Law Journal 94 (1984): 461-489. See also
the seminal work of Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1986).
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following Foucault or Derrida thus become active participants in the inter
rogation of the taken-for-granted assumptions come under scrutiny.
The arrival of "the critique" into the debate community in 1991 meant
that debaters had to cope with some of the same tensions that plagued the
larger academic community. The alluring promise of deconstruction pro
vided incredible temptations for sensitive debaters searching for novel means
of disarming opponents. Although still in its infancy, the appearance of "the
critique" now forces debaters to reassess the arguments that are used to
legitimize the activity itself. If postmodern critics are correct in their assault
on classical liberal thinking, then debate as an activity—with it's emphasis
on evidence, lines of argument, and other formalistic trappings—becomes
an object of interrogation itself.
To this point many of the critiques used have called of the annihilation of
basic assumptions in an effort to win the competition. Three of the more
popular critiques are the post-humanist, statist, and normative critiques.
These arguments question the centrality of humans in the planet hierarchy,
the existence of the state as a method of control, and the use of rhetorical
assumptions in argument construction. Often such systematic critiques seem
to be only peripherally competitive with the policy option outlined by an
affirmative.
Defenders of "the critique" deploy many of the arguments that are mar
shalled by academic deconstructionists in their attacks on modernity and
liberalism. Three primary arguments come to mind in discussing the promise
of "the critique"; (1) consistency; (2) innovation; (3) inclusiveness."
Many debate coaches and judges are familiar with the arguments of the
deconstructionists, and some debaters could claim that the introduction of
"the critique" into academic debate will provide intellectual consistency by
extending this knowledge into the debate world. Rhetoricians and com
munication scholars have appropriated some of the arguments and texts of
the deconstructionists, and questioned some of the totalizing schemes of
essentialists. Why should coaches, judges, and other scholars write and dis
cuss the importance of deconstruction, while at the same time continuing
to support a debate forum built on modern rules of evidence, time con
straints, and other potential symbols of hierarchy? If teachers are constantly
questioning the existence of neutrality and impartiality in epistemic scho
lastic debates, why shouldn't debaters learn to do the same? Wouldn't learn
ing the work of the deconstructionists and other postmodernists provided
a pedagogical bridge that would prepare undergraduate debaters for grad
uate work?
A second argument that debaters have or can raise in defense of "the
critique" is that it is innovative. Debaters in recent years have claimed that
the activity at times seems to be stagnating, as advocates rehash arguments
in theory debates. If debate is to evolve as an activity, then it needs to
constantly expose itself to fresh and insightful ideas that challenges both
participants and judges. Negative teams armed with the possible use of "the
" One should not confuse the implicit rationale we outline here with the three
forms of the critique (thinking, rhetoric, and value) outlined by Shanahan.
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critique" would force affirmative teams to create with fresh responses that
could not be "blocked" due to the infinite variety of potential critiques.
Debate as an activity would no longer involve massive amounts of evidence
marshalled in an effort to create winners and losers—now argument would
be "edifying," "conversational," and "dialogic." Theoretically, participants
would be constructing knowledge together, rather than finding "truth" in
the jungle of the marketplace. Rather than discoverers of knowledge, now
debaters could be innovative by creating information.
Finally, debaters could claim that in the long run, "the critique" expands
the number of participants involved in the debate activity. Deconstruction
theories, with their focus on who gets to speak as well as what is said, would
move debate away from policy oriented argumentation. There would be less
need for evidence from informed experts, because this form of research
involves the circulation and perpetuation of illegitimate hierarchies. Now
the subject feelings of the participants would be just as important as the
alleged dispassionate opinion of agenda setters. Autonomy and liberation
for the debaters would depend on deviation from consensus or norms that
have been established by empowered representatives or institutions. Debate
may have to dismantle itself for the sake of emancipation.
The Peril of "The Critique"
In spite of its innovative potential, the use of "critique" also has some
limitations. We will discuss the academic issues first and then move to the
problems for competitive debate."
Academically, there are a myriad of objections that could be raised against
the deconstruction movement, but we will concentrate on three: its nihilism,
incoherence, and counterproductivity. One argument forwarded by adver
saries is that deconstruction is either nihilistic or Utopian. It is considered
to be nihilistic in that it accepts no "foundation," policy or value that can
provide guidance and direction for scholars and the general public. By asking
scholars to constantly engage in self-reflection and interrogation of subject
positions, deconstructionists focus attention on the negative power of sym
bolic constructs. Some believe that the quest called for by many postmod
ernists is Utopian in nature, in that few members of the public will have
either the capacity or will to engage in constant negative critique. Ironically,
when taken to an extreme, deconstructive perspectives can be employed
by critics who deny the substantive power of rhetoric.
A second criticism that scholars have of deconstruction perspectives re
volves around the contention that some of the postmodern literature is
incoherent and inconsistent. Written with the European accent of French
and German scholars, much of the deconstruction literature is difficult to
fathom in the first place. The demystifications that are attempted of seminal
"We view this essay as a "theoretical" addendum to the pragmatic objections raised
by Shors and Mancuso. See, Mattbew Shors and Steve Mancuso, "The Critique:
Skreaming Without Raising Its Voice," in Health Care Policy: Debating Coverage Cures,
ed. by Roger E. Solt and Ross K. Smith (Winston-Salem: Wake Forest University, 1993),
A-18.
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texts often leave readers and audiences with works that seem to have simply
replaced one form of exclusivity—essentialist centers—with another form
of exclusivity—decentered peripheries. Rather than emancipating critics,
these new "webs of signification" ironically entangle scholars in epistemic
and ontological arguments that undermine the act of evaluation and criticism
itself.
Perhaps the most serious flaw of deconstructive approaches stems from
its attempts to "decenter" texts and forms of subjugation. By taking a per
spective that is unwilling to defend any center of gravity, deconstruction
becomes a process of continual critique and infinite regression, where little
evaluation or comparison takes place between policy alternatives. Very little
political involvement or consciousness raising can take place without cre
ating some public space and defending some principles. By completing eras
ing the privileging of texts, calls into question the benefits of any social,
economic, political, and moral reforms. All social change is illusory, and
power is merely redistributed in limitless polysemic ways.
Pragmatically, the use of "the critique" in policy debate means a virtual
abandonment of many of the cherished assumptions of policy decision mak
ing. Rather than evaluating competing plans or counterplans, debaters are
now going to have to ask judges to oversee "conversations," "discussions"
or attempts at mere "edification." Instead of reviewing the quality or quantity
of evidence that can be marshalled in a typical NDT round, referees may be
invited to contemplate the possibility of having no winner in the round, for
that power may itself be considered "illegitimate." In place of cross-exam
ination, we would now have "interrogations" and "self-reflexiveness."
One of the major strategic problems with the use of "the critique" in
debate rounds would be its inherent assumptions. It is the negative team
that would gain from the introduction of the critique, in that an almost
infinite number of potential objections could be raised against any policy
advocated by the affirmative. It is not unusual for a negative team to present
a post-humanist critique when an affirmative advocates a policy that saves
lives. During the 1993-1994 debate season, cases that advocated a change in
nuclear strategic doctrine (Defense of Last Resort and Nuclear Predelegation)
often confronted critiques that called for rejection of the plan because
attention to nuclear war privileges the continued existence of humanity.
While such changes in doctrine are significant, the critique reduced them
to simply efforts to extend the "life-line" of humanity. In this and other
instances, negative stories could easily paint the affirmative cases as examples
of centrist positions, and negative debaters would take on the persona of
deconstructionists who need not introduce any case takeouts, counterplans,
or overwhelming disadvantages."
Besides its inherent asymmetry, "the critique" may not be that innovative.
Its purported novelty may be little more than a reductionist rehash of the
old communication debate between the Platonists and the Sophists. Many
" Even proponents of the critique admit that this strategy is biased toward the
negative. See, for example, Derek jinks, "Rethinking Critique Arguments," in Health
Care Policy: Debating Coverage Cures, ed. by Roger E. Solt and Ross K. Smith (Winston-
Salem: Wake Forest University, 1993), A-14.
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postmodern works have their philosophical roots in antiquity, where foreign
teachers and students found themselves looking for ways of attacking the
central teachings of Athenians and other Creeks. The works of Heraclitus,
Protagoras, and Gorgias were themselves written as negative critiques of
truth-seekers.''^ Pedagogically, the introduction of the critique would allow
debaters to learn about some of the tensions that exist within the com
munications field without having to apply "the critique" to any practical
case examples.
Besides its inherent unfairness and lack of novelty, "the critique" also
suffers from the problem of being politically irrelevant and counterproduc
tive. Debate is not supposed to be an eristic activity—it is supposed to have
some consequential value. In our traditional debate forums students and
judges are given the opportunity to test some of the policies advocated by
decisionmakers, but with the introduction of "the critique" there is no
position that is placed at risk for evaluation. In many ways, debating is an
inherently rationalistic activity, it asks its participants and audiences to take
seriously the notion that particular policies in the form of plans or coun-
terplans have consequences outside of the "text" that alter moral, political,
economic, and social relationships. The professional visibility of policy debate
alumni points to the utility of this exercise for improving public life.
implications for Debate: Moving Beyond "The Critique"
On balance, many of the arguments that have been used in both the
academy and debate forums to justify the use of "the critique" are unper-
suasive. While sympathetic listeners, we feel that on balance the perils of
"the critique" outweigh any advantage that would come from unleashing
such potent devices in the debate community.
■Yet there are some aspects of the deconstruction perspective that we find
appealing and insightful. We therefore feel that it is possible to selectively
appropriate some of the postmodern arguments to improve debate without
totally adopting a decentered approach to academic and competitive debate.
In place of totally deconstructing "debate" as an activity, we would suggest
an alternative "rapprochement" between traditional critical social theorists
and postmodernism.'^ Rather than accepting a dichotomous position of hav
ing to choose between modern and postmodern perspective, we believe
that it is possible to combine the reconstructive and deconstructive elements
of each. There are some valuable lessons that debate can learn from some
of these critical perspectives that might provide debaters with some positive,
reflexive tools. For example:
7. Expand the Horizons of Source Credibility
Instead of quoting the same influential policymakers or institutional fo
rums, debaters and their coaches might consciously ask judges to begin
" Shanahan's own reading of Heidegger points to the traditional rather than rev
olutionary nature of these insights.
" See for example the work of Mark Poster, Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In
Search of a Context (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) 1.
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listening to the arguments crafted by commentators who are traditionally
given very little public voice (the current feminism debates reflect such a
transformation). The problem we confront here is that the line between bad
evidence and evidence from tenable alternate viewpoints is often blurred.
This would allow the negative critique of existing power structures while at
the same time highlighting some of the policies advocated by the margin
alized.
2. Cloth Particular Policies in Alternative Language Forms
Deconstructionists and other postmodernists have sensitized us to the
multiple forms of discourse and the power of particular language configu
rations. Perhaps debaters could learn to understand, deploy, and evaluate
forms of argument that go beyond the traditional logic of evidence and
formal argument. Narratives and other discursive units may provide poli
cymakers with alternative perspectives. In short, we may need to assess the
implications of the "tech speak" and attending standards of rationality that
dominate policy debate. Many "traditionalists" have been calling for such a
reform in practice for the better part of two decades (in the form of the
unevidenced argument).
3. Replace Notions of "Falsification"
If we live in a postmodern world, then we may need to re-evaluate the
way in which we approach the notion of "truth" and "falsehood" in the
evaluation of debate policies. Rather than attempting to prove one's point
conclusively by falsifying an opponent's argument, we may come to realize
that the choice between two "plausible stories" often involves aesthetic,
ideological, and instinctive judgments that do not pivot on a truth claim.
Our own observations of post-debate "judge baiting" seem to reflect an
implicit acceptance of a "truth" standard, while overtly rejecting such a
standard, by debaters.
In place of the traditional dichotomy that exists between reason and pas
sion, objectivity and subjectivity, perhaps there can be a position where
debaters engage in the quest for a middle ground, where people intersub-
jectively create their social realities and come to realize the range of plausible
alternatives unearthed in such a discussion. Such an approach might go a
long way toward reducing the tension and anxiety exhibited by members
(debaters and coaches) of our community.
In sum, we believe that the use of "the critique" has limited potential as
presently conceived. On balance, nihilistic critiques that "trash" policymak-
ing are as reductionist as the totalizing schemes that they wish to replace.
Placing debaters in a forum where argument is reduced to mere dialogue
or conversation transforms a pragmatic intellectual activity into a game for
dilettantes. Absent a commitment to a reconstructive as well as a deconstruc-
tive rhetoric, the capacity of policy debate to improve our world will be
diminished. A commitment to only a deconstructive rhetoric, creates an
environment of suspicion and apathy at the very point in history that we
should be repudiating such a tact. We agree with Wood and Cox, who have
recently challenged communication scholars to look for ways of finding a
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critical voice that will be able to cope with the "materiality" of discourse-
that alters the way that we think about the environment, food and health
care—or the lack thereof Over the years, debate has survived as a com
petitive and social activity because of its practicality and ability to prepare
students for the trials and tribulations of the real world. "The Critique" taken
to its extremes, only provides us with a means to avoid these challenges.
We therefore approach the potential contributions of the critique with
guarded optimism. We believe that as an analytic tool that complements
policy debate, it has a great deal of merit. The deployment of partial critiques
would still allow debaters to inject the issues of the political nature of evi
dence, the inherent ambiguity of language, and the mystification of expertise
without totally repudiating the tenets of policy debate. Used effectively, this
type of systematic inquiry into the very foundations of debate has a great
deal of promise and potential. If the critique is going to develop into an
effective pedagogical tool, then its advocates in debates need to recognize
that there are inherent limitations placed on them because of the compet
itive nature of policy debate.
See, Julia T. Wood and j. Robert Cox, "Rethinking critical voice: materiality and
situated knowledges," Western Journal of Communication 57 (1993).
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THE POSTMODERN DECISION MAKING
PARADIGM: MOVING BEYOND
FORCED CONSISTENCY






I call people of this sort 'ironists' because their realization that anything can
be made to look good or bad by being redescribed, and their renunciation
of the attempt to formulate criteria of choice between final vocabularies,
puts them in the position which Sartre called 'meta-stable'; never able to
take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in which they
describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency
and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves.'
Does this remind us of anyone, perhaps even of some current parties in
the academic debate community? Why is it that we believe advancing only
one consistent position is the best way to debate? Are we sure that in doing
so we have not been following "a foolish consistency [that] is the hobgoblin
of small minds"?^ An examination of current policy debate theory discloses
several reasons for forcing consistency, ranging from maintaining credibility,
improving style, and increasing validity. However, each of these justifications
depends not on their own merits, but on philosophical foundation which
are rooted in metaphysics. With the works of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida,
and Habermas, to name only a few, it is about time that academic debate
theory begins to take note of, and benefit from, the modern philosophical
and rhetorical theory which engulfs other fields of communication. In ini
tiating this conversation, this paper begins with a brief examination of the
philosophical and historical rationale supporting forced consistency; it then
attacks these rationale and defines, justifies, and gives examples of how to
use a new paradigm for evaluating and accepting inconsistent arguments.
We call this the Postmodern Decision making Paradigm (PDP).
I. Status Quo Presumption for Forced Consistency
The value and expertise derived from learning and mastering the art of
argumentation has been long recognized. In Phaedrus, a mature Plato de
scribes the value of reasoned debate as "a universal art of winning the minds
by arguments, which means not merely arguments in the courts of justice.
' Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
1989), p. 73.
' Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self Reliance (New York: American Book Company, 1893).
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 30, Nos. 1-4 (1993), 57-67.
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and all sorts of public councils, but in private conference as well."^ individuals
use inquiry, advocacy, research, and reasoned judgment everyday and in
most professions. Mastering these processes enables an individual to crys
tallize the concerns of his audience and thereby influence their decision
making process.
Because argumentation imparts obvious and significant benefits to its mas
ters, philosophers, rhetoricians, and statesmen have been concerned with
the practical and theoretical implication of its persuasive techniques."* To a
large extent, these concerns about consistency have been carried over into
academic debate where they have been grounded in the principles of ad
vocacy; as methods of building and maintaining ethos; as fairness to the
opponent; as permissible strategic devices; and as ways of increasing the
validity of one's claims. Each of these principles takes for granted the notion
that we should not argue inconsistent points of view. In a world where
advocacy skills have become exceedingly important, however, this need not
be the case.
Why have we believed that arguments need to be consistent? Why is it
that we worry about the ethos, pathos, and logos of the speaker and their
arguments? In their own way, each of these elements contribute to the
speaker's persuasiveness. Speakers gain credibility by showing that they, and
their arguments are honest, trustworthy, and reliable. Pathos is enhanced
when speakers build momentum towards one particular desired outcome.
And, in the same way, we believe that a speakers position is enhanced when
his evidence and his proofs do not undermine one another. However, in
dividuals may be able to increase these persuasive elements by showing
objectivity, open mindedness and impartiality. This increase can occur by
successfully arguing inconsistent positions, so long as they are well reasoned
and explained.
We believe the modern evolution of both fields, argumentation and de
bate, are better served by allowing the use of inconsistent positions within
an overarching argumentation strategy. C.H. Perelman states that "the only
discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not de
monstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the
term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but
which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions
put forward."' Only through examining the evolution of rhetorical and ar
gumentative theory can we adequately find answers and justifications for a
new paradigm, and foster its acceptance and application.
II. Historical Antecedents
If we are at all concerned that we are now seeing things in a limited way,
then we would want to ask ourselves how it is that we have come to see
' Plato, Phaedrus page 261 quoted in Freely, Austin J., Argumentation & Debate: Critical
Thinking For Reasoned Decision Making (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Press, 1993),
p. 4.
See e.g. Plato, "Gorgias," Dialogues of Plato, ed. Reginald Allen (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1984).
' Perelman, Chiam, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, trans. John Petrie
(New York: Humanities Press, 1963), p. 86-87.
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things the way we do. Any answer to this type of question necessarily implies
some historical invention to make the past intelligible in the context of this
article. One popular way of doing this has been to return to the practices
of the early Greek sophists like Gorgias and Protagoras in order to show
how their philosophical choices directed us toward what we now believe:
that inconsistent arguments should not be advanced by the same debate
position.
One of the first rhetoricians in Athens, Gorgias of Leontini argued that it
was improper to construct arguments founded on reasoning from consis
tency. As Guthrie points out:
To show up the absurdity of Eleatic, and particularly of Parmenidean, logic
(the absurdity of arguing from 'it is' and 'it is not' as such) was of the utmost
importance both to common sense and to the theory of rhetoric. Gorgias
would hardly wish to deny the existence of everything in the sense in which
the ordinary man understands existence; his aim was to show that, by the
sort of arguments that Parmenides used, it was as easy to prove 'it is not' as
'it is'.'
What remains of his sophistic argument can be found in On the Non-Existent,
where Gorgias "maintains that nothing exists, that even if anything does exist
it cannot be apprehended by man, and even if it were apprehensible it
would be impossible to communicate".' Gorgias claimed that if one uses
Parmenidean logic to prove the truth (a metaphysical project) or the exis
tence (an epistemological project) of something, one could also use the same
methods to prove it's untruth or nonexistence; these methods could be
commonly used in academic debate to permit refutations from inconsistent
positions. In fact, this strategy is currently being used by negative teams in
the case of hypothetical counterplans and from within hypothesis testing
paradigms:
All such permanent 'natures' would be abolished on Gorgias's thesis, but the
form of his arguments shows that their irony was aimed especially at Par
menides and his followers, to demonstrate that on their own reasoning it is
as easy to prove the contrary of x as x itself.®
What Gorgias and other Sophists opened up was the possibility that the
world could be conceived without a "normative natural order." Once pos
sible, the Greeks used this idea to differentiate their understanding of reality
into scientific-like manipulable parts, each of which could be studied inde
pendently. As the Sophists began to differentiate the functions of oratory,
prose, and drama from each other, they realized the persuasive effects each
could have when humans are indecisive and abandon what logic—what was
called above Eleatic or Parmenidean logic—seems to tell them. Emotion
could be separated from logic and science could be separated from philos
ophy. As they learned to differentiate more of these parts, their vocabularies
grew and so did their ability to theorize about their world. While others
developed these into sciences, Gorgias expressed his doubts about the 'com-
' W.K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 194.
' George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from
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municability of this kind of knowledge: interpretations of the way things are'
and the degree to which one could know them:
The doubts found in the treatise On Not Being reappear in the Helen, where
Gorgias reveals a very vivid sense of the state of ignorance and uncertainty
which is habitual for the human psyche, the resulting tendency for the psyche
to be guided by mere opinion, and the way virtually anything one sees or
hears can cause the abandoning of the opinion for another. The powers that
logos as a creator of opinion has are correspondingly immense; it can make
the spectators at a tragedy weep as if the sufferings evoked by the dramatists'
words were their own; it can use philosophical discourse to transform com
pletely an audience's conception of the universe; it can overturn from one
minute to the next in the course of debate the hearer's conception of what
is valid and not valid; and it can charm and persuade a whole throng, even
when untrue.'
If humans could believe a thing to be either true or not true simply by stating
arguments eloquently, how far back might the subjectivity of knowledge
go? More importantly, what end does and should knowledge serve in such
a system? Undoubtedly the idea of a full exploration of the limits of reason
and knowledge scared certain Greeks who then discouraged further explo
ration of these questions. Some have argued that:
Skepticism about the attainability or communicability of knowledge, such as
is maintained in Gorgias's On Not Being, or relativism of the kind usually
assumed to lie behind Protagoras's famous assertion that man is the measure
of all things, might, if consistently maintained, have removed some of the
inhibitions that operate in traditional societies to prevent full exploration of
all of rhetoric's possibilities."
It is interesting to speculate about what either their and our society would
be like if the Greeks had come to accept all knowledge as relative, reason
and logic as incomplete, truth as nonexistent or incommunicable, and human
activities as without normative meaning to higher beings. But, they did not
pursue these notions." Instead, their scientific successes led them to believe
that knowledge could be gained, that reality could be uncovered with better
reason, and that this knowledge could be communicated. They believed
' Thomas Cole, The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 146.
" Id. at 145.
" See e.g., id. at 152-53. Cole writes, "Gorgias's skepticism, like Protagoras's rela
tivism, obviously shared the rhetorician's recognition of the problematic character of
human communication. But having recognized the problem, both men choose, by
and large, to circumvent it rather than seek a solution along rhetorical lines. Their
main activity appears to have been directed toward the study and presentation of
those arguments, themes, and techniques whose occurrence was sufficiently wide
spread that their overall usefulness was independent of the changing tastes of audi
ences, or the changing availability and communicability of truth in various circum
stances. To proceed further than this toward the production of a genuine art of
rhetoric would have required precisely those disciplines of which there is no trace
elsewhere in Protagoras, Gorgias, or any of their contemporaries: a systematic psy
chology that would countenance the possibility of constructing a particular piece of
persuasion according to preset plan and an epistemology that would make possible
the idea of an unmediated verbal rendering of reality by reference to which rhetorical
deviations can be identified, characterized, and put to conscious use."
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that truth would be naturally persuasive and that it could eventually be more
fully realized as humans learned to reason and philosophize with fewer
errors;
Gorgias' idea that "[o]nly knowledge, based on unshakable proof, could with
stand the attacks of peitho, and there is no such thing ... was, in Plato's eyes,
the arch-heresy which he must do his utmost to destroy. He must show, first,
that there is such a thing as true and false opinion. Next, because If they are
only opinions the true one will be as vulnerable as the false to the wiles of
the persuader, he must restore the criterion of judgment and demonstrate
how opinion can be converted to knowledge by 'thinking out the reason.'""
The Greeks, following Plato, proceeded to develop deeper scientific mor
phologies of their world, built on presumably stable foundations called
knowledge and reason. Another way of saying this is that as a result of Greek
philosophical choices, we continue to believe in the goal of acquiring knowl
edge through clear logic and reason, each of which are dependent on the
ability to eliminate contradictions and inconsistencies. In academic debate,
this translates into a view that there is only one way to argue properly and
that this way is based on rigorous logic and use of the scientific method. In
the social sciences where this is not always possible, the attempt to mimic
logic and scientific methods is highly praised. The development of logic,
like the system of mathematics which we all have come to accept as standard,
is based, all the way down, on the same principles.
At present, the only way to argue inconsistent positions is through con
voluted and easily misunderstood vocabulary: the hypothetical syllogism,
permutations in counterplan theory, and hypothesis testing. Modern theory
does not endorse and strongly disfavors the presentation of contradictory
positions without such qualification. This disfavor can be traced to the Pla
tonic fear that the human psyche can be easily swayed if we permit ourselves
to accept, justify, or even consider alternate formulae for logos.
111. The Way Things are Done Now, and the
Way They Could Be Done
Modern debate theory holds steadfast to the notion that "... if the two
advocates in an academic debate allow themselves to present contradictory
or inconsistent arguments, the effect is almost certain to be defeat."" Con
tradictions are believed by many to upset the natural checks and balances
in an argument or refutation strategy. However, as postmodern theory would
suggest, a distinction must be drawn between an inconsistency and a con
tradiction. Outside the world of academic debate, the two may appear sim
ilar, but where an inconsistency may be unintentional, a contradiction is
both unintended and undesirable. For example, affirmative teams are more
often held to stricter advocacy requirements than are negative teams. The
" Guthrie 273.
" Freely, Austin J., Argumentation & Debate: Critical Thinking For Reasoned Decision
Making (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Press, 1993), p. 206.
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affirmative is expected to justify a policy option where initially the negative
had the option of choosing whether or not to present their own coherent
policy.
This approach evolved as comparatively smaller, yet credible affirmative
advantages require negative teams to present their own policy options, and
effectively out compete the affirmative policy option with their own advan
tages. Consequently, allowing negatives to advocate alternative plans, while
at the same time defend the status quo, has become common practice; while
prohibiting, punishing, or even penalizing the introduction of inconsistent,
but not contradictory statements, continues. This practice makes no sense
from either the perspective of rhetorical theory or academic debate.
Academic debate has gone through many transformations since its incep
tion. Since the first National Debate Tournament at West Point in 1947,
academic debate has incorporated various tactics and strategies for success.
Affirmatives were required to meet the basic prima facie requirements and
to solve a problem in the status quo. Negatives were responsible for de
fending the current system and began with the presumption of validity. As
clash rose and the procedural requirements mentioned above began bearing
down on both sides, debate witnessed a shift in the negative's burden: from
defeating change to the status quo to arguing that the affirmative was wrong.
Until the introduction of counterplan, neither side made much use of pre
sumption. Affirmatives would respond to counterplans with alternative jus
tifications for the affirmative resolution and the comparative advantage case.
Not until the introduction of conditional counterplans and hypothesis testing
did the playing field become much more theoretically complicated. As the
community decides between these new approaches and the more formalistic
approach of policy systems analysis, modern debaters and judges who like
to think of themselves as tabula rasa have begun accepting arguments which
move between paradigms as frequently as they find it practical to do so. The
net weight of accrued advantages on either side seem like they make un
derlying policies less relevant. Even in the weighing which is usually per
formed at the end of the round—which sounds something like "the affir
mative's nuclear war occurs before the negative's"—there is an inherent
disregard for the actual plan. This may not be so bad if the plan is seen as a
tableau on which debaters and audiences can test their argumentative and
persuasive prowess with multiple media: policies, potential consequences,
argument theory, etc. Somewhere, debaters need to learn how the world
of argumentation fits together, because beyond academic debate there is
little protection from the diversity of potential responses.
Debate has undoubtedly taken on a different role than it had in the late
1800's when Harvard or Yale would bargain for a contract debate with an
other school. The focus of debate must be viewed in a different context
today. Debate still educates and trains individuals in the art of persuasion
and argumentation, and it still requires the development of invaluable know-
how. Debate also continues to be one of the greatest avenues for acquiring
knowledge on diverse but timely issues. One must not forget the notion
that debate is fundamentally an intellectual exercise with a competitive slant.
It is with this spirit in mind we believe there is both a place and a need for
PDP in academic debate.
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IV. Justifications for, and Execution of PDF in
Academic Debate
Justifications for the use of PDP can be found in the very professions which
argumentative and debate strategies are the most useful, politics and law.
The first of these is political discussion and the legislative process. Politicians
are often forced into the position of answering to various constituents, critic,
media and supporters. From the early stages of a political campaign, to
debates against opponents, to communicating with constituents after elect
ed, politicians must walk a very delicate line between appearing to be in
consistent. The art to being a successful politician centers around the ability
to tell the right story, maintain a credible image, and offer the right solutions.
Without referring to any one particular individual over another, many
politicians have taken their knocks for appearing to be inconsistent; only to
rebound in popularity and gain credibility and influence when able to dis
tinguish these apparent contradictions. This talent and skill is crucial to
surviving a political campaign.
For the politician who desires to influence policy, the ability to argue
inconsistently is a valuable skill to have. Whether a reformer or preserver of
particular legislation, the nature of the process requires the usage of incon
sistency to be successful in gaining or defeating passage, in committee hear
ings the sole purpose of the "hearing involve[s] controversy over policy.
Controversy leads to refutation, but refutation is blunted because claims are
made through a questioning process."" Similar to the various attacks which
form a partisan attack against a particular bill in debate on the floor, this
questioning period in hearings involves pre-known facts, but enable the
opposition to develop a strategy to counter the policy. This form of argu
mentation is also true in the legal arena.
For years, citizens have understood the importance of sfeeking the assis
tance of seasoned and experienced individuals, trained in the art of advocacy,
learned in the area of law, and successful in their pursuit for justice. Argu
mentation in law can vary according to the particular type of case, however,
the need to clearly identify the legal issues and principles involved, explain
the specific claims asserted, and construct a coherent and sound case have
always been considered paramount. The main difference between the two
major areas of law, criminal and civil, has been the required standard of
proof of the argument. In criminal cases, the argument needs to cross the
threshold of a "reasonable doubt." In contrast, civil cases are only required
to demonstrate a "preponderance of the evidence." In both instances, a
typical and accepted practice of answering claims is "arguing in the alter
native."
In Common law tradition, a party was unable to plead hypothetically or
in the alternative." The Court strongly discouraged and reacted harshly to
individuals that even inadvertently advanced alternative claims, much the
" Rieke, Richard D., Argumentation and Critical Decision Making, (New York: Harper,
1993), p. 240.
" Friedenthal, jack H., et al, Civil Procedure, 2ed., (St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing,
1993), p. 266.
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same way debate does today. Even if a pleader could prevail under an al
ternative legal theory, that option was unavailable if the wrong course of
action was originally chosen. Judges began to recognize the need and fairness
for individuals to be able and win their case under a coherent legal theory,
even if it may contradict other arguments in their favor. This was done by
simply maintaining requirements of clarity and simplicity through separating,
designating and numbering the arguments. Stated concretely:
The theory is that on the trial the proof will determine on which set of facts,
if any, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Where the pleading is in the alter
native in different counts, each count stands alone and the inconsistent
statements contained in a count cannot be used to contradict statements in
another count.''
The higher goal of truth-seeking in justice outweighs a traditional notion of
consistency. For lawyers, judges and the people, "sound policy weighs in
favor of alternative pleading, so that controversies may be settled and com
plete justice accomplished in a single action."''
Recognizing the practical application of PDF in modern professions, we
believe there are several traditional justifications used for participating in
academic debate which also endorse PDF. These include critical thinking
skills, mental dexterity and freedom of thought. Critical thinking is described
as the:
Understanding of the relationship of logic to logic, which would lead to the
ability to analyze, criticize, and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and
deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound
inferences drawn from unambiguous statements of knowledge or belief."
Being able to argue inconsistent positions or explain the difference between
contradictions, draws upon and enhances each of these. The ability the argue
PDF requires fast thinking and problem-solving skills in order to analyze and
reason quickly, answers to a contradiction objection by your opponent, thus
demonstrating strong mental dexterity. Likewise, the ability to take different
and inconsistent views at the same time, and to switch back and forth be
tween "incommensurate paradigms," is the hallmark of a truly flexible and
conceptual thinker.
The marketplace of ideas has always been believed to exist in academic
debate, if anywhere. Escaping presumptive rules of fashion, style and eti
quette has recently come to exist in an effort to increase this notion of truth
seeking. If this is true, arguing inconsistently is the only way to get ideas and
thoughts out which would reveal a sought after solution to any particular
question. The marketplace is well served from a well-defined, and practically
implementing PDF.
Academic debate has also been credited with serving as the training grounds
for future lawyers, politicians, and public speakers. So, what of the concern
of bad training that might result from permitting inconsistent arguments?
" Urnest v. Sabre Metal Products, Inc., 22 III.App.2d 172, 159 N.E.2d 512.
" McCormick v. Kopmann, 23 III. App.2d 189, 161 N.E.2d 720.
" Freely, referring to a California Executive Order, p. 1.
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Here lies the best answer and perhaps the best justification for permitting
inconsistent argumentation. The debater who can more quickly recognize
asserted contradictions from their opponent and who is more agile at bal
ancing the substantive and procedural aspects of the round, as they relate
to the contradictions, should be rewarded. The same is true for a public
speaker who can effectively mold a speech to appeal to one audience with
numerous viewpoints, for the politician who can appease various members
of a diverse audience, and the lawyer who has the duty to provide a zealous
defense of a client who is most likely guilty. Being able to understand the
traps and misunderstandings that surround the use of inconsistent argu
mentation should be seen as a goal of academic debate when it is so clear
that in each of these professions the debater would be better off. Being
versed in the ability to argue and fully appreciate the device of inconsistency
is not only permissible (in contrast to what Plato would have us believe), it
should be necessary (as Gorgias might argue). Only someone who has gained
expertise in this form of argumentation is prepared to respond to others
when they either intentionally of unintentionally advance them. So what
exactly is PDP? How would debaters successfully argue it? How would judges
incorporate it into their philosophies?
There is no simple answer. Subjectivity and overall acceptance from the
community may be stumbling blocks. The seasoned debater, however, could
get the task done. We believe three things are paramount for this new
paradigm. First, the theory behind the paradigm should be explained at the
beginning of a debate, to provide a clear understanding of the strategy and
serve as fair warning to the opposing side. This is more critical until such
time as the paradigm is argued, modified, perfected and accepted through
the course of debate practice evolution, much the same way the "Critique"
took hold in NDT rounds.
Second, the benefits of the strategy should be clearly articulated for that
particular round. This serves the dual purpose of increasing the credibility
of the approach, while avoiding the appearance that positions just happen
to contradict. As we state earlier, contradictions should continue to be
discouraged, and strict penalties assessed against teams failing to justify in
consistencies in argumentation.
This brings us to the third rule, clarity and distinction for the critic and
audience. There should be a greater penalty, like less acceptance of the
position, for teams that are unable to present and utilize the paradigm, and
merely confuse all the participants. We believe this can easily be done through
the course of even the most sophisticated debates; and after the paradigm
has gained acceptance, help debaters argue positions and judges decide
those close cases, where contradictions and inconsistencies exist.
An example of how debaters could execute PDP would be arguing over
the value of human life. Suppose the issue is health care, and the affirmative
argues the current system fails to provide enough care to save lives. Coun
tering this, the negative may advance the position that the status quo already
saves enough lives to answer the affirmative case harm. While at the same
time advancing a different value system, under malthus, which argues against
saving lives in the short run. The test is whether an explanation for an
apparent contradiction exists. In this case it does. Life is important, lives are
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being saved now, but If some people slip through the system that is not
necessarily bad. Population growth may be slowed, and the survival of future
generations is preserved. The justification for allowing PDF in this instance
is simple; the need to test various value systems. Without knowing the exact
moral outlook of a judge, debaters are forced to run a multitude of argu
ments, attempting to find the special issue or "hook" the judge will grab
onto. Arguing inconsistently enhances this process.
Another example may be an economy debate. The negative argues that
the economy is stable now, not necessarily growing, but that if it were to
fall into a depression, it would be good. They might at the same time arguing
that health care spending is bad for the economy in the long run. A simple,
but articulated distinction between growth cycles and government spend
ing, long waves and soft landings, inward type depressions and constrained
monetary recessions would help to ease the contradiction. On face these
distinctions may be awkward or contain considerable tension, but a little
savvy could reconcile these positions, and the different decision-trees em
ployed to consider these tensions engenders considerable conceptual flex
ibility.
The trap to avoid is obvious contradictions which have no explanation for
reconciliation. Stating the economy is currently growing, and claiming it's
stable now, would fail this test. A reasonable standard of clarification will
help harmonize an acceptable standard for inconsistent arguments, and the
possible evidentiary contradictions they may entail.
Even though debaters may try out PDF, and the general debate community
accept this form of argumentation, the key will still be for judges to become
receptive to the idea and usage of PDF. This should not require a Herculean
effort, since modern debate theory has partially embraced most of the prin
ciples warranting PDF. By clearly defining PDP's dimensions and role, ev
eryone can prosper. Remember that the role of a judge is:
... not to choose sides and then ignore the other half. Nor is it to try, however
tempted, to adjudicate the dispute, decide who is right and then simplify.
He need join neither the Chamber of Commerce nor an Eastern religion. His
job rather is to describe the conflict accurately, to insist on criteria condign
to each side. Such criteria, such coordination, more readily come to hand
for serious reality than for the rhetorical view, but neither side is, in principle,
more difficult to understand. We must, that is, rehearse again the quarrel
between philosophy and rhetoric. And this time around, we must do more
than use philosophy to debunk rhetoric, as the scientific world has done.
This debunking ends in that thinning of reality's texture, that ontological
discomfort, those tremors of nonexistence, so familiar to us now as science's
last best gift to a grateful mankind."
Academic debate provides the perfect testing ground for students of
communication and rhetoric to become experts in recognizing, defending,
and dealing with both contradictions and inconsistencies, just as Protagoras'
belief—that arguing both sides of a resolution gives one an informational
and tactical advantage over one's opponent—survived and triumphed over
" Lanham, Richard, Motives of Eloquence, Literary Rhetoric in the Renaissance, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 34-35.
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strict rules of argumentative conduct a few decades ago, so sfiould the
methods of arguing inconsistencies. Without creativity in strategic policies
as well as strategic theories, stagnation in debate—and worse yet, in the
minds of debaters—would be guaranteed. Debate has always been known
for its revolutionary ideas and principles, not to mention a long history for
breaking with tradition. This is so, not because debaters like to be conten
tious, but also because debaters love the games. Why artificially limit the
size of the playing field?
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A key feature of year-end national debate championships, notably the
National Debate Tournament (NDT), bas been the availability of judging
philosophies to guide the development and adaptation of arguments before
a panel of judges. With the wide variety of perspectives on how issues should
be resolved, on what issues are useful and germane to the topic, and on the
acceptability of different practices within the round, philosophies have at
tempted to provide insight into a particular judge's unique worldview. The
philosophy forms of the 1980s included sections on Decision-Making Par
adigms, Topicality, Counterplans, Add-ons/Turnarounds/Disco, and Style.
Some anecdotal evidence suggested that the forms were outdated and did
not reflect current concerns. Most judges, for instance, do not have any
problem with the theoretical concept of teams using turnarounds as part of
their strategy. Beginning with the 1993 NDT, a new form was developed
attempting to more accurately reflect issues and practices of competitive
policy debate in the 1990s. The new categories include Theory, Topic Spe
cific Arguments, the use of Evidence, and Style.
The shift to a new philosophy form offered an opportunity to assess com
munity attitudes and feelings toward judging philosophies in general and
the specific changes in particular. The survey was supported in part by the
Policy Caucus and its continuing efforts to maximize community input into
the future of policy debate, it was designed to assess the scope of current
usage, to rate the utility of particular sections of the philosophy, and to
explore reactions to various policy options for revising or changing the
approach to judging philosophies. In addition to quantitative data, which
are presented in abbreviated form in Appendix 1, written comments were
also solicited, and are reproduced in Appendix 2.
This report, a service of the Policy Caucus, hopes to present valuable
information to debaters about adapting to judges on the basis of their phi
losophy, to judges about constructing their own philosophies for maximal
effectiveness, and to the community for determining the future of the judg
ing philosophy process. The first section provides a summary of the results,
the second section offers implications and thoughts about the future of
judging philosophies. For those interested in researching or finding out more
about judging philosophies, a partial bibliography of writings on policy de
bate judging philosophies is offered in the select bibliography.
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 30, Nos. 1-4 (1993), 68-81.
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Results
Demographics
Out of approximately 250 surveys distributed at the 1993 NDT, 74 were
returned, including the input of 12 program directors, 28 coaches, 30 de
baters, and 4 others (mainly hired judges). The sample included a wide mix
of programs, with different levels of activity in policy debate. In regional
competition, 20% of the respondent's programs rarely reached elimination
rounds, 17% frequently did, and 62% almost always reached the elimination
rounds. At national tournaments, 55% of the programs rarely made the
elimination rounds, 16% frequently did, and 28% almost always qualified
for the elimination rounds. At the extremes, then, 20% (15) rarely reached
the elimination rounds of regional tournaments, while 28% (21) almost always
reached the elimination rounds of national tournaments. All respondents
together averaged 8.19 years of participation in debate; program directors
averaged 19.5 years experience in debate, coaches 7.6 years, debaters 4.5
years, and other respondents 5.75 years in debate.
Use
In the specific areas of using and marking philosophies for adaptation in
the rounds, 97% (71 of 73) indicated that they read or marked the philos
ophies immediately before the rounds started. The average number of rounds
that respondents had read or marked philosophies for during the past year
was 9.75. In adapting in the round, 99% (70 of 71) claimed that they had
used the philosophies to adapt particular arguments for the judges, and had
done so an average of 9.71 rounds during the last year. Eighty-three percent
of the coaches and program directors (34 of 41 responding) agreed that they
had used the philosophies to coach their teams for particular rounds (and
had used philosophies for an average of 9.70 rounds during the last year).
In assessing the scope of usage, 100% (71 of 71) marked that they had
used the philosophies at the NDT, 71% (17 of 24) indicated they had used
philosophies at the American Debate Association (ADA) Championships, and
90% (47 of 52) reported that they had used philosophies prior to the NDT.
Somewhat at odds with this last question, when asked if their school sum
marized, used, or adapted judging philosophy during the regular season,
only 69% (42 of 61) responded affirmatively.
Usefulness
One very interesting result is the generalized difference between per
ceptions of how useful the philosophies are and how accurately they reflect
judges' decisions. Comparing the responses on a 5 point scale (1 = Strongly
Disagree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree) between
whether philosophies are useful (mean of 4.27, Standard Deviation = .56)
and whether they accurately reflect actual judge decision-making (mean of
3.25, SD = .98), philosophies were rated significantly more useful than ac
curate (t (146) = 5.45, p < .001). Many of the comments also indicated some
suspicion about accuracy, but further emphasized the ultimate utility of
having the judging philosophies available.
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Examining the shift from the old judging philosophy form, the categories
of the new judging philosophy form were generally accepted and approved.
On this same five point scale, the Theory section received a mean rating of
3.96 (SD = .79), Topic Specific Arguments rated 4.14 (SD = .87), Evidence
rated 3.79 (SD = .76), Style rated 3.89 (SD = .87), and the section asking
judges about the number of tournaments attended rated a 3.55 (SD = .98).
As indicated here, the topic specific arguments seem most important, with
evidence and number of tournaments less important. The comments provide
additional support for this ranking, as some of the respondents wanted more
emphasis on topic specific issues, perhaps including a question on the cri
tique strategy and on philosophical decision criteria like deontology. There
was concern expressed in the comments about finding out the amount of
research or reading done by the judge, which is arguably more important
for adaptation purposes than the number of tournaments judged.
The function of judging philosophies was also surveyed, yielding relatively
predictable results. Respondents were asked to rate (again on a SD to SA
scale) whether philosophies should list positions judges refuse to listen to,
strong biases, evidence reading policies, pet peeves, and stylistic prefer
ences. These items were then ranked by respondents in order of importance.
In order of priority, positions judges refuse to listen to came first (response
mean of 4.56, SD = .77, mean rank of 1.45), followed by strong biases (re
sponse mean of 4.6, SD = .67, mean rank of 2.03), pet peeves (response mean
of 4.24, SD = .74, mean rank of 3.72), evidence reading policy (response
mean of 4.25, SD = .68, mean rank of 3.75) and stylistic preferences (response
mean of 4.26, SD = .75, mean rank of 4.09). Style again ranked last in the set
of those categories considered important for discussion in the judging phi
losophy, but it nonetheless received a mean score of 4.26, somewhere be
tween Agree and Strongly Agree.
Finally, it is apparent that at a general level the new philosophy form was
much preferred to the older form, a finding consistent with the move to
make the categories more appropriate for policy debate as it has evolved
into the 1990s. In testing the difference between ratings for the sections on
the old and the new philosophy, the perceived utility of the new philosophy
(mean response of 3.67, SD = .85) was significantly greater (t (145) = 4.5, p
< .001) than the old philosophy (mean response of 2.75, SD = .97). Much
of the commentary also indicated a preference for the new philosophy, with
a few significant suggestions for further improvement.
Policy Options
Several options were presented on the survey, including providing phi
losophies at the beginning of the season, providing them at major tourna
ments, abolishing them, changing the categories, setting no guidelines for
the philosophies, using objective questions, and using stricter enforcement
mechanisms for guaranteeing that judges provide philosophies. Some op
tions not specifically surveyed did arise in the commentary, including short
ening the philosophies, and providing a forum during the year to generate
suggestions for categories on the philosophy form.
On the same 5 point scale (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree), the most
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support generated was for collecting and disseminating philosophies at major
tournaments (mean of 3.86, SD = .87), followed by collecting and dissemi
nating philosophies at the beginning of the season (mean of 3.76, SD = .91),
and then by providing no guidelines and letting judges say what they want
(mean of 3.16, SD = 1.21). There was virtually no support for abolishing
philosophies (mean of 1.39, SD = .6), or for using objective questions (mean
of 1.71, SD = .74). There was slightly more support, though still not sub
stantial, for stricter enforcement on providing philosophies (mean of 2.33,
SD = 1.1), and for changing categories on the form (mean of 2.91, SD = .7).
Implications
The first point which arises from this survey is that philosophies are
indeed an important part of the national tournaments, and that most par
ticipants take them seriously both in writing them and in using them to adapt
arguments to the judges. Of the 24 respondents providing written com
mentary on the question of how seriously they take their own judging phi
losophy, 10 used the phrase "very seriously" in explaining the importance
of the process. Several important points were made about the importance
of judging philosophies in general which deserve mention. One debater
commented that "judging philosophies are a must for small schools who
don't travel the national circuit and don't know many judges well." Another
remarked that "they are very helpful in allowing me to adapt to a particular
judge. In particular they point me in the right direction in terms of what
arguments to stress." One program director advanced a very different view
of the utility of the judging philosophies:
... [T]he statements served to advance theory, strategy, and the pedagogy
of both, in as much as we ail seem to spend some time figuring out how our
colleagues think (and write about their thinking). I take my own thinking
fairly seriously. It's always interesting to see who shares this sensibility and
who would just as soon mask his/her preferences with abstractions and gen
eralizations that do not really commit him/her to anything. I think we could
do without written judging philosophies, but I don't think we will. But 1 also
think we should be honest about all that we use them for: testing degrees
of openmindedness, literacy, and intellectual rigor.
The idea of philosophies contributing to the evolution of debate theory and
practice seems an obvious point, but is one which deserves reiteration for
judges considering the (re)construction of their philosophies for next year.
This larger view of the function of judging philosophies is borne out by
the difference between perceptions of the utility and the accuracy of judging
philosophies. This seemingly contradictory result (if they are not accurate,
why are they useful?) lends some support to the idea that the philosophy
currently gives a general sense of knowledge about the topic, general open
mindedness, and intellectual rigor.
Which leads to a second major point, the consideration of reconstructing
the judge philosophy form. Alternative possibilities for categories or for a
general approach to the form for generating philosophies were suggested
in the commentary. One program director argued that the "debate com
munity would get more written response if it didn't force the coach/critic
into pigeon-holing theoretical, practical, and tactical predispositions into
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categories." While there was some support (mean of 3.16) for eliminating
guidelines for judging philosophies (an "open" philosophy), there was con
siderable spread in the responses on this question (Standard Deviation of
1.21). This variance might reflect concerns that given such a free form, there
would be little basis of comparison among the diversity of judges, if one of
the purposes of the form is to reduce the uncertainty of debaters and coach
es, the functionality of the form would be reduced. The community indicated
other areas of priority that a specific form could more forcefully direct
responses toward (i.e. Topic Specific Arguments, Evidence). Several com
ments queried about a category for the critique, a specific strategy ques
tioning the assumptions of the resolution now enjoying some prominence,
which might be included on the next judging philosophy form (indeed that
category was added to the 1994 form). Perhaps in a larger sense the sug
gestion for a forum soliciting different categories should be considered,
maybe every other year, so that some parts of the form evolve and adapt
faster than the old judging philosophy form, which was a standard for almost
a decade.
The community also might want to consider categories for inclusion that
more fully address familiarity with the topic (amount of reading and research),
and specific theoretical preferences (valuing links or impact more, thresholds
for link acceptability, etc.). Absent community actions to revise the form,
judges should be aware of the information need that is being expressed here,
which includes more specific decision criteria preferences, along with spe
cific skill capacities like flowing tags or evidence or both. A program director
summed it up this way;
What debaters want to know is whether the judge Is an intelligent, judicious
listener, whether the judge has much of a background on the topic, whether
the judge has much of a background in debate, and what sorts of arguments
the judge would likely coach his or her team to run against the aff/neg.
That, coupled with the high ratings and rankings of specifying positions a
judge refuses to listen to, judge biases, and pet peeves, may be the surest
guidelines in constructing a judging philosophy, and in shaping the philos
ophy form for future use.
Finally, it is worth addressing the possibility of making philosophies avail
able either at the beginning of the season, or at major tournaments. Of the
70 participants responding to these two questions, 67% (47) either Agreed
(34) or Strongly Agreed (13) that philosophies should be collected and dis
seminated at the beginning of the season, while only 7% (5) either Strongly
Disagreed (2) or Disagreed (3) with this option. An even higher percentage,
71% (50) either Agreed (35) or Strongly Agreed (15) that philosophies should
be collected and disseminated at major tournaments, with only 4% (3) either
Strongly Disagreeing (2) or Disagreeing (1). One debater suggested "distrib
uting philosophies at the beginning of the year, amending them for Wake,
and amending them for the NDT. This would give debaters an idea of how
their judge feels about the topic. Naturally, as the year progresses, judges
need to change their philosophies because 'pet peeves' may develop."
One interesting comparison in the data is between the debaters and coach
es and program directors. On the option of providing philosophies at major
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tournaments, the debaters mean response (4.1) statistically was not signifi
cantly greater than the combined mean for coaches and program directors
(3.68), but it was very close to being significant (t (68) = -1.1, p < .13).
Likewise, the debaters mean response (4.03) on providing philosophies at
the beginning of the season was significantly greater than the combined
mean for coaches and program directors (3.55), but not quite at a 5% sig
nificance level (t (68) = -1.29, p < .09). These tendencies may reflect a
greater concern with procedural difficulties among program directors and
coaches, or it may just be that debaters feel the need for philosophies more
sharply than their coaches (or perhaps both).
^ There are, of course, many logistical difficulties to implementing such a
system. Judges may not know they will be attending tournaments until the
last minute, many hired judges do not want to bother with writing a phi
losophy, and a change such as this could create significant burdens for
tpurnament directors. It seems difficult to conceive of the NDT Committee
overseeing a process to collect and disseminate judging philosophies either
at the beginning of the season or at major tournaments. It also seems unlikely
that tournament hosts will voluntarily collect and distribute these philoso
phies. Perhaps the community could explore the viability of other organi
zations managing this task, or of building the judging philosophy into the
process of tournament submissions. While there will always be gaps, and
difficulties, the community does seem to feel that the judging philosophies
fill an important role in audience analysis and adaptation, and this role should
be further explored by the NDT Committee, by the Policy Caucus, perhaps
by the districts in their meetings, and by other interested individuals.
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Use of Judging Philosophies (JPs)
Read/Mark judging philosophies before tourna •
ment started? 73 52 21
Read/Mark jPs before rounds started 73 71 2
# times read/marked this year? 64 9.75
Use JPs to adapt to judge? 71 70 1
# times used to adapt to judge this year? 56 9.71
Use JPs to coach teams? 41 34 7
# time used JPs to coach teams this year? 27 9.70
Usefulness of Philosophy Sections
Theory section useful? 73 3.96 .79 m
Topic Specific Argument section useful? 73 4.14 .87
Evidence section useful? 73 3.79 .76
Style section useful? 71 3.89 .87
Number of tournaments sections useful? 68 3.55 .98
New judging philosophy more useful? 69 3.67 .85 '
Old philosophy sections useful? 69 2.75 .97
Judging philosophies useful? 70 4.27 .56
Judging Philosophies accurately reflect deci
sion-making? 71 3.25 .98
Scope of Usage
Used at the NOT? 71 71 0
Used at ADA Nationals? 24 17 7
Used prior to the NOT? 52 47 5
Adapted/used during the regular season? 61 42 19-
Functions of Judging Philosophies
Should include positions judges won't listen to? 70 4.56 .77
Rank of positions refuse to listen to? 1.45
Should include strong biases? 70 4.60 .67 .
Rank of strong biases? 2.03
Should include evidence reading policy 68 4.25 .68
Rank of evidence reading policy? 3.75
Should include pet peeves? 67 4.24 .74
Rank of pet peeves? 3.72
Should include stylistic preferences? 66 4.26 .75
Rank of stylistic preferences? 4.09
Policy Options
JPs collected/disseminated at beginning of sea
son? 70 3.76 .91
JPs collected/disseminated at major tourna
ments? 70 3.86 .87
Abolish judging philosphies? 69 1.39 .6
Change categories? 69 2.91 .7
Set no guidelines? 69 3.16 1.21
Shorter and more objective questions? 70 1.71 .74
Stricter enforcement on providing philosophy? 70 2.33 1.1
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Appendix 1. Extended.
Strong Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree
N % N % N % N % N %
Use of Judging Philosophies (jPs)
Usefuliless of Philosophy Sections
1 1.3% 2 2.7% 12 16.4% 42 57.5% 16 21.9%
2 2.7% 2 2.7 5 6.8% 39 53.4% 25 34.2%
1 1.3% 2 2.4% 18 24.6% 42 57.5% 10 13.7%
0 0% 7 9.8% 11 15.4% 37 52.1% 16 22.5%
3 4.4% 5 7.3% 21 30.8% 30 44.1% 9 13.2%
1 1.4% 2 2.8% 27 39.1% 27 39.1% 12 17.4%
8 11.5% 17 24.6% 28 40.6% 15 21.7% 1 1.4%
0 0% 0 0% 4 5.7% 43 61.4% 23 32.8%
4 5.6% 12 16.9% 20 28.1% 32 45.1% 3 4.2%
Scope of Usage
Functions of judging Philosophies
1 1.4% 2 2.8% 0 21 30% 46 65.7%
0%
1 1.4% 0 0% 1 22 31.4% 46 65.7%
1.4%
0 0% 0 0% 9 13.2% 33 48.5% 26 38.2%
0 0% 1 1.5% 9 13.4% 30 44.8% 27 40.2%
1 1.5% 0 0% 6 9.1% 33 50% 27 40.2%
Policy Options
2 2.8% 3 4.3% 18 25.7% 34 48.6% 13 18.6%
2 2.8% 1 1.4% 17 24.3% 35 50% 15 21.4%
46 66.7% 19 27.5% 4 5.7% 0 0% 0 0%
2 2.8% 12 17.4% 47 68.1% 6 8.7% 2 29.0%
6 8.7% 18 27.1% 13 18.8% 23 33.3% 9 13.0%
32 45.7% 26 37.1% 12 17.1% 0 0% 0 0%
19 27.1% 23 32.8% 15 21.4% 12 17.1% 1 1.4%
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Appendix 2: Written Commentary
Key: pd = Program Director, c = Coach, d = Debater, o = Other
What do you think of the new judging philosophies?
Are they accurate? Useful?
pd. Accuracy is marginal but enough to be useful. I don't think most
judges pay much attention to the categories on the form.
c. They are o.k. The specific argument section is much better.
pd. About the same.
d. Provide interesting information and give a general background. Most
of the time they are useful, but not always accurate. I think that they can
give a place to start from in understanding the judge, but I do not think
they are a 100% accurate.
pd. I have not noticed a difference.
pd. Much better—the old form was antiquated.
c. Much better than before.
c. Yeh. They are useful.... sort of even accurate. Its really the little things
like no international fiat allows, or I don't get it with critique/kritik, etc.
d. They're accurate and very useful and they should be made available
at all tournaments.
d. New judging philosophies are fine. Most give info you want although
sometimes judges do not reflect on topic specific issues which they have
biases on.
c. Are very useful. Sometimes not very accurate, but extremely useful.
c. Sometimes, but they are rarely useful when looking at bias to schools/
regions.
o. What new philosophies?
d. Judging philosophies help us to figure out strategies before rounds.
They also help us to learn/figure out what the judges like to hear (or what
helps them to decide) in the final rebuttals.
o. Entertaining at times.
pd. Are they new? Not much difference from the old ones. The big
problem is that few people actually judge in accordance with what's claimed
on the philosophy. Most "judges" use the philosophy form to be (or appear
to be) clever, cranky, deeply theoretical, etc. These forms are an excuse to
posture in the guise of appearing to be helpful.
d. Any insight into the philosophy of a judge is useful. For the most part,
the philosophies which I've read this year have been accurate. Philosophies
should be distributed at the beginning of each year, then amended by Wake,
and amended for the NDT.
d. I think that they are very helpful in allowing me to adapt to a particular
judge. In particular they point me in the right direction in terms of what
arguments to stress.
pd. I really don't notice much difference between the two. Some people
follow the guidelines, some people don't.
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c. 1 consider the new questions an improvement. They are as accurate
as one could expect them to be.
d. Yes.
c. Too much overlap between views on general theory and topic specific
arguments.
pd. Neither better nor worse than old ones.
d. I like them. They seem more germane to the rounds as they are
debated. Obviously, we use them a lot and find them helpful.
pd. The new philosophies seem to continue to emphasize matters of
specialized interest to upper level debaters, possibly even increasing that
focus. As a director of a small program, with primarily inexperienced de
baters, much of the material in the philosophies is irrelevant to their range
of skills. The major issues of how the judge resolves contradictions, of levels
of acceptable significance, of how the judge calculates impacts from prob
ability and risk, and other "basic" info become much more important bits
of information for our development.
d. More useful, but should include additional categories (critique/de
ontology/ philosophy).
d. They're totally fresh, smooth, and ribbin' with an R & B tip.
d. Yes—it always helps to know people's positions—especially on issues
which biases are strong.
c. Not really—people are still stuck in the old paradigms which as a
community we've abolished.
pd. The new ones are better than the old ones. Topic-specific prefer
ences are much more useful than abstractions and generalizations about
paradigmatic/decisional criteria. I think debaters need some notice of what
triggers reactions from a judge—especially in the case where the judge
would like to let them avoid wasting time (or embarrassing themselves). It
can also even the playing surface when a team is less familiar with a judge
than their opponents. I'm not sure this needs to be done on paper. I don't
mind it too much personally, but tournament directors (of all sorts) are having
a tough time getting judges.
d. Actually, didn't really notice. Not really. I think they should include
pictures so we can kiss up to people.
c. I like them. They seem accurate and useful.
c. They're fine—no complaints.
d. They are helpful.
d. They're just fine. Judging philosophies are a must for small schools
who don't travel the national circuit and don't know many judges well. Their
accuracy is dependent on how well you can read and interpret them.
What improvements would you suggest?
c. Debaters need to know this is what judges will do.
pd. That you begin the collection process before district tournament
weekend.
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c. There should be a philosophy book put out first semester.
d. Different questions like disclosure policy, and strong bias should be
put in the book. Further, they should be made available at all tournaments.
No debater should ever wonder who an adjudicator is.
d. A topic specific section on the knowledge/biases a judge has towards
issues on this topic.
c. Less structure, just have judges say what they like.
c. I think they are fine generally. I like them to be as specific as possible
though.
o. Don't use the back side of the page.
d. The other judges take them a little more seriously and take the time
to figure out what is important to them in a round.
o. Print them on fine parchment with gold leaf and decorative endpaper,
with a mahogany leather binding sporting the NDT log and embossed seal.
pd. Judges might say if they 1) do research on the topic and how much,
2) flow tags, quotes, both, neither, 3) value links or impacts more, 4) have a
threshold for what constitutes a disad (or turn) link, and 5) are a pussy-
unable to pull the trigger for a non-rep team. Also, it's inexcusable that so
many judges at this year's NDT did not provide philosophies. It's inexcusable
that most of the judges we got were the ones for which no philosophies
were available.
d- I suggest distributing philosophies at the beginning of the year, amend
ing them for Wake, and amending them for the NDT. This would give de
baters an idea of how their judge feels about the topic. Naturally, as the year
progresses, judges need to change their philosophies because "pet peeves"
may develop.
d. That more emphasis is placed on telling what judges think about cer
tain issues and how much explanation they require for an argument.
c. That judges be more open to arguments—this activity is for the stu
dents. Let them at least try to defend their position in an open forum without
restrictions.
d. Condense some judges' sheet. The 3000 word philosophy takes too
much time to read. Many judges are vague on their arguments.
pd. An open forum with suggestions for categories to include.
c. It might be useful to ask how much reading a judge has done on the
topic, or how much research.
c. Let the judges say what they want. If I don't have strong biases, I
shouldn't have to discuss them. Also, there may be biases that don't fit the
pigeon holes.
d. I would look for a way to incorporate more topic specific opinions
on the forms (i.e. critique). Also, I would like to see a stronger enforcement
in having judges' give their honest opinion as to the issues.
pd. Debaters should be encouraged to make specific inquiry about what
some statements mean.
d. CRITIQUE/DE-ONTOLOGY/PHILOSOPHY—a new category.
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d. Good enough now—just get everyone to turn every one in.
c. 1) Have an open format—let judges say what they want and not en
courage the "old Issues" which aren't useful at all. 2) Get someone competent
to put the book together. E.G. I was notified only 24 hours before the
philosophies were due that mine had not been received.
pd. The debate community would get more written response if it didn't
force the coach/critic into pigeon-holing theoretical, practical, and tactical
predispositions into categories. What debaters want to know is whether the
judge is an intelligent, judicious listener, whether the judge has much of a
background on the topic, whether the judge has much of a background in
debate, and what sorts of arguments the judge would likely coach his or her
team to run against the aff/neg. Make the "form" more open-ended, pro
viding suggestions (based on students' real needs) instead of categories. I'd
also suggest that they be reducible to 150 words for folks who don't want
to take the time to identify their feelings about theory and paradigms.
d. Hire more judges who buy anarchy.
o. Leave it open to begin with—no categories. Judges who have judged
a lot will know what to put—and how they put their answers will be reflective
of how often they've judged and will thus serve as an indicator to debaters
of that judges experience on the topic, or debate in general.
d. Distribution at other national circuit tournaments. Make sure every
one hands one in.
How seriously do you take your own judging philosophy?
How much time do you take to write it?
pd. I spent about an hour. I take it very seriously. I distribute it in every
debate (either orally or in writing), not just at the NDT. 1 strictly enforce the
rules enunciated in my statement.
c. Very seriously. Being a first year coach it is often the only exposure
debaters have to how I might view the round. I took a few hours to think
about the philosophy and a few hours to write and re-edit it.
c. Was rushed and simply revised from last year,
pd. Pretty seriously—1 hour,
c. Very seriously,
pd. Very seriously. 2 hours,
pd. Very seriously—revise over a couple of days,
c. Rather seriously—try to accurately present my own judging views,
c. Serious enough ... a couple of hours ... I think about how do I judge
.. then try to put it down ... try to give helpful ideas ...
c. Fairly seriously, it takes about 20 minutes to do it.
c. Very serious. More than necessary!
pd. I take a lot of time to write mine but I'm guilty of the posturing
criticism I make above. 1 also don't believe that debaters or coaches ever
read and adapt to my philosophy.
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c. If I take the time to write it, that is what I believe.
pd. Very seriously—I have developed it over several years.
c. Pretty seriously. A couple of hours.
c. Very seriously. Actually writing time is short, but I think about it a lot
(too much).
pd. Very seriously. About 2 hours.
pd. Generally, I try to give fair warning. This year, selected "late" (Tuesday
before the NDT), I didn't make the philosophy a high priority. I didn't do it
until Friday morning. When I did it, I spent about an hour adapting last year's
philosophy. While judging this tournament, I've tried to be governed by the
philosophy.
d. I'm a debater, cousin!
c. I take it quite seriously. 1 hour or so.
pd. Very seriously. And quite a bit of time. I think that the statements
served to advance theory, strategy, and the pedagogy of both, in as much
as we all seem to spend some time figuring out how our colleagues think
(and write about their thinking). I take my own thinking fairly seriously. It's
always interesting to see who shares this sensibility and who would just as
soon mask his/her preferences with abstractions and generalizations that do
not really commit him/her to anything. I think we could do without written
judging philosophies, but I don't think we will. But I also think we should
be honest about all that we use them for: testing degrees of openmindedness,
literacy, and intellectual rigor.
c. Its usually a rush job before the NDT. I think if they were disseminated
throughout the year they'd be more accurate since certain rounds trigger
things I'd like to include but do not remember by the time I do it for NDT.
c. As seriously as possible. I took a long time to think about it. The actual
writing process took about 15 minutes.
c. I usually take an hour to gather my thoughts—it's very difficult to
summarize a generalization about how I put a round together.
Prepared under the auspices of the Policy Caucus.
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